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Abstract
We present the first detailed measurement study and models of the virtual populations
in popular Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs). Our results
show that, amongst several MMORPGs with very different play styles, the patterns of
behaviors are consistent and can be described using a common set of models.
In addition, we break down actions common to Trading Card Games (TCGs) and ex-
plain how they can be executed between players without the need for a third party referee.
In each action, the player is either prevented from cheating, or if they do cheat, the oppo-
nent will be able to prove they have done so. We show these methods are secure and may
be used in many various styles of TCGs. We measure moves in a real TCG to compare to
our implementation of Match+Guardian (M+G), our secure Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocol for
implementing online TCGs. Our results, based on an evaluation of M+G’s performance on
the AndroidTM platform, show that M+G can be used in a P2P fashion on mobile devices.
Finally, we introduce and outline a HYbrid P2P ARchitecture for Trading Card Games,
HYPAR-TCG. The system utilizes Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) and other P2P over-
lays to store cached game data and to perform game matchmaking. This helps reduce
the network and computational load to the central servers. We describe how a centralized
server authority can work in concert with a P2P gameplay protocol, while still allowing for
reputation and authoritative account management.
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Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) are a well established, profitable busi-
ness. Most major MMOGs available today, such as World of Warcraft (WoW) [Ent] and
Warhammer Online (WAR) [Bio], use a centralized server environment as the cornerstone
of their architecture. While this model certainly is sufficient, as is shown by the large user
base for these games, it suffers from a problem of over-provisioning. Specifically, over-
provisioning is the problem that although, any given time, active user population may not
be very large, there are peak times when it is. In order to support this surge in user base,
game providers must allocate servers and bandwidth necessary to support peak anticipated
load. An alternative to this architecture is a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) based system, in which
gameplay mechanics and game state are maintained by clients participating in the game,
instead of the central server.
In the field today, there exists a great deal of research in (P2P) based MMOGs. How-
ever, not a great deal of work has been done in terms of trying to understand how the player
1
Behavior Aspect Description
Player Distributions How players are distributed amongst
different areas of the virtual world
Player Sessions How long players play the game
Player Movements How often players move between dif-
ferent areas of the game, and how long
they stay in an area after they move into
it
Table 1.1: Key Aspects of Player Behavior in MMOGs: A listing and description of critical player
behavior aspects to consider when designing a P2P based MMOG
behaves inside the virtual world. Table 1.1 describes the key aspects of player behavior
that need to be considered when creating a P2P based Massively Multiplayer Online Game
(MMOG).
Accurate models, based on empirical evidence, of the player behaviors mentioned
above allow for researchers to simulate new architectures using representative player be-
havior models. This significantly improves the ability of researchers to show that one
particular architecture is better than another. We provide a set of models based on observed
behavior in some of the largest Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMO-
RPG) games active today, with the goal of helping researchers gain a better understanding
of the behavior of players inside MMOGs.
In online Trading Card Games (TCGs), similar to MMOGs, online gameplay exists but
typically relies on a client/server architecture. This requires that clients must be connected
to the server at all times. However, unlike MMOGs, there exists little work on moving this
gameplay style into a Peer-to-Peer environment.
In order to advance work in the emerging field of P2P based TCG gameplay, we pro-
pose, analyze, and evaluate a P2P based protocol, Match+Guardian (M+G), to decentralize
2
gameplay while preventing cheating. Furthermore, in order to solve the over-provisioning
problems that current game designers have to face, we propose a HYbrid Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
Architecture for hosting TCGs, HYPAR-TCG. This system offloads much of the compu-
tationally heavy and network intensive operations onto the clients themselves. This allows
for a lightweight server presence without introducing unacceptable delay to the gameplay
clients.
1.1 Importance of Topic
Existing work in MMOG modeling uses very naive assumptions about the behavior of
populations in virtual worlds, such as uniform distribution of players, which can lead to
incorrect observations about the performance of their presented architecture. Our models
provide the first realistic representation of user behavior inside an MMORPG.
In TCGs, there is no comprehensive P2P based protocol for handling all aspects of
gameplay in mobile and possibly disconnected environments. The work that has been done
to date contains severe limitations that make them unusable in those environments. Specif-
ically, the solutions presented either involve expensive commutative encryption, such is the
case with the solution to the Mental Poker [Blu83] problem, or require several disinter-
ested peers to be available, as is proposed in the P2P TCG schemes presented in [WK05]
and [Yeh08]. Our protocol, M+G, allows for many types of TCGs to be implemented in a
P2P manner using lighter weight encryption schemes and no need for a disinterested third
party peer. This allows for more flexibility in how the user plays the game while maintain-
ing an acceptable level of responsiveness to user actions.
3
One of the largest barriers that prevents independent game developers from being suc-
cessful on a large scale is the financial barrier associated with standing up a large, central-
ized server environment. HYPAR-TCG is a comprehensive architecture for hosting TCGs
with a minimalistic centralized server presence. The benefit from this architecture is real-
ized in the scalability of the system. Without as large of a demand for server side resources,
the number of servers required to manage a large user population can be reduced. This al-
lows for supporting a larger user base with a smaller operating budget.
1.2 State of the Field
While prior measurement research has been done on MMOs, it has primarily focused on
traffic modeling and characterization. Though traffic measurement is important and use-
ful for research in MMOs, it represents only one aspect of modeling player behavior and
cannot help with identifying player actions inside the game. Our models compliment the
traffic modeling work by adding another dimension of understanding to the actions per-
formed by people inside a virtual world. This allows for more complete representations
of players during simulations, which helps with the accuracy in evaluations of prospective
architectures.
The work done to date in creating P2P based TCG protocols [WK05] [Yeh08] has
focused primarily on a solution utilizing the idea of shared secrets, a concept in which
individual nodes know a piece of the information being kept private but cannot discern
what the hidden information is. Only when collecting all the secrets from every player
and putting them together is the secret revealed. While this mechanism is effective at
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preventing players from knowing hidden information in a game, its main limitation is that
a trusted peer must be used when creating the initial set of secrets to distribute. This adds
a requirement to the protocol that nodes, other than the ones involved in the game must
be available to serve as arbiters, and precludes people from being able to play in situations
where such resources are not available.
Almost all existing work in P2P game architectures has been in the area of handling
messaging and state management in MMORPGs [YV05, SSB09, MTKE11, JZ08, AS09,
BCG08, JPNF10, LZXC06, CRJ+04, BDL+08, AS08, CM06, MTKE11]. Unfortunately,
MMORPGs have a very different set of problems that need to be solved, such as efficient
messaging to a group of hundreds of people and managing a persistent game state across
an entire virtual world. A P2P TCG architecture will contain many players but all will be
playing small games of usually no more than a dozen members. Furthermore, the game
state is only persistent for the length of the individual match. Our P2P TCG architecture,
HYPAR-TCG, allow us to take advantage of the large user base when caching player data
and performing matchmaking. Our P2P TCG protocol, M+G, lets us take advantage of the
small game size when designing a message passing protocol for playing.
1.3 Goals
Our goal is to help expand the understanding of player behavior inside Multiplayer Online
Role-Playing Games, and to introduce mechanisms for supporting Trading Card Games
inside a P2P environment.
Specifically, there are three main problems we wish to address with our work:
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• Gaining a better understanding of player behavior within MMORPGs
• Creating a cheat-proof P2P based Trading Card Game (TCG) protocol
• Outlining a comprehensive, hybrid P2P architecture for TCGs using M+G
It is our hope that, in so doing, we will help advance the area of games research by pro-
viding accurate data and robust game architectures upon which the community can build.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
A description of relevant background material is provided in chapter 2. We begin by de-
scribing the state of the field in terms of MMO and multimedia modeling. In addition,
we outline the challenges that face a Peer-to-Peer based game, including cheating and net-
work connectivity issues. Finally, we describe many popular P2P network topologies in
use today, comparing and contrasting each one in terms of key capabilities.
In chapters 3 and 4, we describe the observation process for, and the generated models
of, the following MMORPG player behaviors: movements, zone transitions, and total play
time. Our data collection methodology, along with a characterization of the data we gath-
ered, is outlined in Chapter 3. We describe the process by which we created an add-on for
two highly popular MMOs, World of Warcraft (WoW) and Warhammer Online (WAR). We
also show the general trends of the data, including player rankings in term of chosen race
and class. In chapter 4 we introduce the results and models derived from our observations.
We show that existing models and assumptions regarding these behaviors are incorrect, and
need to be revised.
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In Chapter 5 we present our work on Match-Guardian (M+G), a P2P protocol for TCGs
and other MOGs, that allows for decentralized gameplay while preventing cheating. We
begin by outlining common forms of TCG play, and the required protocol steps necessary
to support those play styles. We then describe a cheat-proof algorithm for implementing
those steps. Finally, we show that, although P2P gameplay incurs an overhead on client
machines in terms of extra computation cost, that cost does not introduce a perceptible
delay to players.
We outline a HYbrid P2P ARchitecture for Trading Card Games, HYPAR-TCG, in
Chapter 6. The goal of this architecture is to allow for decentralized gameplay and in-
formation lookup while maintaining a trusted central authority for signatures and billing.
The chapter opens by providing a description of the measurable aspects of architecture
performance. A breakdown of central server roles in a hybrid P2P architecture is then pre-
sented. After that, we describe how a P2P overlay can be used as both a matchmaking tool
and content cache. This helps offload some of the server responsibilities to the client. A
comparison of the performance of the central server, in both a traditional client/server ar-
chitecture, and HYPAR-TCG follows. We show that HYPAR-TCG performs much better




Our work will focus on three main areas: MMOG Player Modeling, securing gameplay
in P2P based TCGs, and outlining a hybrid-P2P architecture for hosting TCGs. First, in
order to thoroughly understand the state of the industry concerning MMO modeling, we
will detail existing work in that area plus work in the adjacent area of Multimedia Mod-
eling (including traffic modeling, video coding, and video modeling). Second, we will be
providing background on the components necessary to implement a cheat-proof TCG pro-
tocol, as well as a taxonomy of the kinds of cheats we intend to prevent. Finally, we will
review Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) and other P2P overlays, summarizing the strengths
and weaknesses with each. This will allow us to make an informed decision when choosing
which overlays to propose for use in HYPAR-TCG.
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2.1 MMO Player Behavior Modeling
Over the last several years, a significant number of measurement studies have been per-
formed on MMOs, though most of these have focused on traffic patterns and network char-
acteristics. Chambers et al. studied network patterns related to players and the server of
small networked multiplayer games [CFSS05]. Their measurements show diurnal patterns
of game populations. Kim et al. measured network patterns on Lineage II, a popular MMO
in Korea [KCC+05]. Their work focused on network packet sizes, Round Trip Times
(RTTs), session times and inter-session arrival times. The data they recorded shows a
power-law distribution for session times. This is similar to the the times we show in Chap-
ter 4.2.3. Ye et al. devised a set of performance models for MMORPG servers and networks
based on concurrent player population [YC06]. Chen et al. profiled packet inter-arrival
times, packet load distribution, and bandwidth utilization of ShenZhou Online, a popular
MMORPG [CHHL05]. Svoboda et al. modeled traffic patterns and sessions lengths for
players of WoW using both wireless and wired Internet connections [SKR07].
Beyond network traffic measurement, some research has looked at traffic patterns, ses-
sion lengths, and latency when measured with respect to players and user behaviors.
Tarng et al. performed a long term study of WoW in order to see if it was possible to
model subscription lengths of players based on how much a user plays a MMO [TCH08].
They showed that while it is possible to predict short term behavior, long term prediction is
much more difficult. Claypool and Claypool characterized latency requirements of various
online games in terms of the deadline in which a user command must be processed and the
precision of the commands the user is issuing [CC06]. Traffic patterns and session lengths
of WoW were profiled with respect to different player action categories by Suznjevic et
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al. [SDM09]. They hypothesized that mobile devices could be used for some of the less
traffic intensive player activities. Fernandes et al. characterized traffic patterns in Second
Life during different player activities in the world [FKS+07]. Kinicki et al. expanded on
the work of Fernandes et al. by considering object and avatar interactions of the player
in the virtual world when modeling traffic characteristics [KC08]. Finally, Szabó et al.
provided a model from which you can detect the activity of a user within a MMORPG
by correlating the traffic patterns observed through passive monitoring and packet level
introspection [SVM09].
Chen et al. looked at how player interactions and virtual location relates to network
traffic patterns and physical location [CL06]. Similar to our recent work, they found that
player locations in the virtual world follow a power law distribution. They also observed
that there is a correlation between continuing social interaction in a MMO and physical
topology closeness with the player’s IP address. The categorization of player interactions
was achieved by identifying packet traces and observing common patterns. Kawale et al.
created a churn model for players in MMOs that took into account the social aspect of
gameplay [KPS09]. They showed that how engaged a player is with a MMO can be used to
accurately model churn amongst players. Liang et al. studied movement patterns in a Net-
worked Virtual Environment, Second Life [LTN+08]. They collected metrics on how often
a player moves between zones, which paths the player takes to get to new zones, and how
total population changes over time. Their results for player population are very different
from those observed in our work with MMORPGs. Instead of a diurnal pattern to player
arrivals and departures, the authors observed a fairly constant amount of churn through-
out the day. They suggested a hybrid mobility model for player movement that consists
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of both a random waypoint model for outdoor movement and a pathway model for indoor
movement. Miller et al. studied player movement in World of Warcraft battlegrounds, a
subset of the WoW game world [MC09]. They observed 13 battles using observers in the
game, and concluded that players who participate in battles are likely to remain throughout
the entire battle. Also, they hypothesized that a waypoint model for player movement in a
battleground may be useful, but would not represent more than 50% of all movement pat-
terns. Nae et al. provided a dynamic resource allocation model for MMOs based on user
traces [NIP10]. The goal of providing this model was to move away from the centralized
over provisioning of servers used to handle peak load and instead request resources from
external data centers on demand. Seay et al. looked at how players in MMOs communicate
with each other and group together. They also measured through survey how “committed”
players felt towards their in-game guild [SJLK04].
In order to better demonstrate where our contribution lies, within the current bodies of
work concerning MMOs, we have broken down the relevant publications into a table listing
the research categories for each paper. Table 2.1 lists those categories.
While all of the related work provides important contributions towards modeling MMOs,
especially in terms of traffic behavior, our work is the first to provide details of the MMO-
RPG virtual world, its population distributions, player movements, and player interactions.





Dynamic Resource Allocation [NIP10]
Latency Requirements [CC06]
MMO Resource Utilization [NIP10]
Network Characteristics [CFSS05]




Player Interactions/Movement [CL06] [KC08] [LTN+08] [MC09] [SDM09]
[SVM09]





Traffic Patterns [SKR07] [SDM09] [FKS+07] [KCC+05] [YC06]
[CFSS05] [CHHL05] [SVM09]
Virtual Interactions [FKS+07]
Virtual Player Distributions [CL06]
Table 2.1: Categorization of Previous Work in MMOs: A Categorization of Previous Work in
MMOs broken down by focus area of the research
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2.2 Multimedia Modeling
In order to more completely understand the bodies of work that are related to MMO mod-
eling we will now look at a related field, multimedia modeling. Within this field we will be
concentrating on three subcategories: traffic modeling, video coding and video modeling.
2.2.1 Traffic Modeling
There have been many papers written in the area of multimedia traffic modeling. Golaup,
et al. described a set of traffic patterns for complex multimedia applications, and created a
simulation framework to facilitate future studies [GA06]. Lazaar, et al. produced a simpli-
fied model of real-time video sources based on two different time scales, the frame and slice
level, that accurately modeled the real time video sources they were using. They also as-
sessed how much of an advantage their models could provide in an ATM network [LPP94].
Liang et al. demonstrated how fuzzy classification techniques could be used to classify
MPEG video traffic into either movie or sports categories. Their algorithm performed cor-
rect classifications with a fairly low percentage of false positives [LM01]. Neame et al.
proposed using the M/Pareto process, a process that represents periods of overlapping long
transmission bursts, to model video traffic over packet switched networks. They showed
that if constants are defined correctly, this algorithm was effective in predicting sample traf-
fic captures. The authors were unable to provide a method for determining the constants in
real time, however, which presents a limitation of the algorithm’s effectiveness [NZA99].
Shah-Heydari et al. provided a method of estimating parameters for a Markov-Modulated
Poisson Process (MMPP) used to model multimedia traffic on an Asynchronous Transfer
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Mode (ATM) network. They showed that, using their technique, MMPP could reasonably
approximate general traffic behavior [SHLN00].
Pantel et al. assessed the impact that network delay would have on real-time multi-
player games. They showed that for a racing game, a genre they classified as a worst case
scenario in terms of latency requirements, a delay of up to 50ms is acceptable [PW02a].
Diot et al. provided an evaluation of the bucket synchronization mechanism of MiMaze,
a multiplayer online game. They showed that the impact of network delay could be min-
imized by synchronizing game state at fixed intervals, and that users were satisfied with
play experience even when player position was accurate only 65% of the time. The scale
of the authors’ experiment was small however, and they note that the scalability of their
algorithm could be a problem [DG99]. Bettner et al. provided a description of the network
design choices made in the development of the Age of Empires series. Most notably, the
authors go over the P2P design principles that the games utilize, as well as the motivation
for those designs. In order to minimize update communications, simultaneous simulations
on all clients are performed. Various optimizations are also presented that further reduce
the network overhead [BT01].
Pantel et al. studied the applicability of dead reckoning schemes for games. They an-
alyzed seven different prediction mechanisms, and discussed the suitability of each mech-
anism in different types of games. Their conclusion was that dead reckoning helps mask
some of the artifacts introduced in games by network delay [PW02b]. Aggarwal et al. at-
tempted to reduce the negative effects of network latency in dead reckoning algorithms. In
order to do this, the authors created a scheduling algorithm that delayed updates to play-
ers with low latency in order to accommodate players with high latency. In an attempt to
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mitigate the delays introduced by this algorithm, the authors also provided a budget algo-
rithm that allowed for the overall update interval to be reduced. This reduction comes at
the expense of not every player getting an update each round [ABMR05]. Mauve proposed
a consistency mechanism for dead reckoning games that involves recomputing events in
the past when new information is received. Mauve believes that this “timewarp” algorithm
will prevent a scenario when an unrecoverable event (such as Player A shoots Player B) is
incorrectly predicted due to dead reckoning [Mau00]. Cai et al. created an adaptive dead
reckoning algorithm based on area of interest, or AOI. When a player is outside of another
player’s AOI, the amount of updates sent between them will be reduced. The authors show
that, using this system, the number of updates needing to be sent to all players is reduced
without a large sacrifice in correctness [CLC99].
This group of works’ focus is very different from that of player behavior modeling. The
focus of these traffic level papers are to:
• Predict traffic patters for real time resource allocation
• Categorize at a high level the genre of videos being transmitted
• Characterize the impact of delay to a multiplayer game
• Mask network jitter by efficiently sending status updates to interested players and,




Video coding deals with how video data can best be represented. There have been several
papers written in this area. Aizawa et al. discussed methods of encoding 3-D represen-
tations of human faces in very low bit-rate applications [AH95]. Han et al. proposed an
object based encoding scheme for motion video in low bit rate environments that utilizes a
Markov Random Field (MRF) model based on color intensity information. They showed
that their model could be a viable alternative to the traditional block based encoding stan-
dard at low bit rates [cHW98]. Torres summarized the evolution of second generation
video coding schemes [TKP96]. Specifically mentioned was the MORPHECO project,
which focused on segmentation based encoding. Neff et al. discussed a very low bit rate
encoding scheme using the concept of matching pursuits. In this algorithm, the video’s
signal is passed through a multi-stage dictionary of functions. At each stage the best ap-
proximation of the signal is chosen, the energy of that approximation is subtracted from
the original video. The remaining energy of the signal is passed on to the next stage as
a residual [NZV94]. The authors showed that while this method of video encoding can
produce better results at low bit rates, than other algorithms, there is a significant increase
in computational cost.
These papers’ focus is exclusively on how to best encode video for transmission across
the network. Although the encoding scheme might take into account the motion of objects
within the video, no attempt is made to more broadly categorize the motion into models of




The area of video modeling is focused on how best to index videos stored in a database, so
that content can be retrieved based on some set of meaningful metadata.
Day et al. presented a model for automatically indexing videos based on both spatial
and temporal events using a common set of n-ary operators. The proposed system is hier-
archical in nature and allows for multi-level indexing of information [DDI+95]. Hjelsvold
et al. provided a generic data model for querying video that was adapted to television news
domain [HM94]. Li et al. provided a model of the spatial relationship of objects in a video
that supports a comprehensive set of queries [LOS96]. Petkovic et al. created a frame-
work for video modeling that focused on automatically mapping features into an internal
representation that incorporates the semantics of the video [PJ00]. Vasconcelos et al. pre-
sented a system, called BMoViES, that infers semantic content from the visual patterns in
the video [VL98]. The authors are able to show that, with a 90% level of accuracy, they are





While this group of work does not specifically address the issue of modeling behavior,
it would be conceivable given a large enough body of videos involving MMOs to be able to
query for interesting statistics utilizing the indexing mechanisms provided. Unfortunately,
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there is not nearly enough raw video material in the genre of MMO games to allow for this
avenue of research.
2.3 Trading Card Game Protocols
Most modern trading card games have their roots in Magic: The GatheringTM, which was
released in 1993. The game consists of a complete library of cards where players build
their own collection by purchasing packs of cards. Each individual card has some level
of rarity such that the more rare a card is, the fewer copies are produced. Each card pack
has some guarantee of containing a set ratio of very rare, rare, and common cards. For
example, a card pack may be guaranteed to contain at least one very rare card, three rare
cards, with the remainder being common cards. As one may guess, the rarest cards tend
to be the most valuable and are often the most powerful in terms of gameplay, thereby
creating an economy around collecting the rarest cards. Other well-known examples of
trading card games include PokémonTM, the World of Warcraft Trading Card GameTM, and
the Yu-gi-oh! Trading Card GameTM.
2.3.1 Mental Poker and Distributed Random Number Generation
The idea of playing cards in a distributed fashion without cheating, termed mental poker,
was first discussed by Shamir et al. [SRA81]. The authors show that its impossible to
deal from a shared deck of cards without one player knowing what card another player
received. They then described a protocol that relies on commutative encryption to solve this
problem. Note that their impossibility result still holds: if one could break the encryption
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in a reasonable amount of time, dealing from a shared deck of cards without revealing who
received which card to the other player is still impossible. The primary difference between
this problem and our problem is that in our case, the deck of cards between players are not
shared. Without a shared deck, our solution can avoid using commutable encryption. As
with their solution, we rely on the encryption not being easily breakable, where easy means
within the span of time it takes to complete a game.
The protocol described in Chapter 5 relies on being able to generate a random number
between two or more players fairly. In this case, we define fairly as either player not
being able to influence the outcome of the generated random number. This is solvable
by the well-known coin flipping by telephone protocol [Blu83]. With this method, Alice
picks a random number rA, cryptographically hashes it and sends the hash, H(rA) to Bob.
Bob picks a random number, rB, signs it and sends it to Alice. Alice then XORs rA and
rB to determine the final value. Alice can then reveal the result later by giving Bob her
private number allowing Bob to compute the same value. Note that since Alice has no idea
what number Bob will pick, she cannot influence the final random value. Furthermore,
Bob cannot influence the final value since he has no idea what initial value Alice chose.
Expanding this to n players requires that each player generate a private number and one
public number to share with the other n − 1 players. Each player then XORs their private
number with the n− 1 other public numbers.
2.3.2 P2P Turn-Based Gameplay
An alternative to solving the shared resource problem in a P2P environment was presented
by Wierzbicki et al. in [WK04] and improved on in [WK05]. Specifically, the authors were
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trying to solve playing ScrabbleTM, a word reconstruction game using a shared set of letters,
in a P2P environment. Their solution involved the use of several disinterested players to
act as arbiters for actions such as shuffling the letters and choosing a shuffled letter from
the set of available resources. Message secrecy was handled through constructing shared
secrets that would be distributed between the arbiters. While the authors do show that their
protocol is effective at preventing cheating, it requires several players to be in a P2P overlay.
Also, if the node that creates the shared secret to distribute is colluding with another player,
it is possible to know all the shared secrets for a given letter.
While the author’s protocol could be adapted for our needs, it is, like the mental poker
solution, far more complicated than is needed to handle a non-shared resource game such
as TCGs. It is interesting to note, however, that if the rules of ScrabbleTM were slightly
modified to allow for generating letters based on their probability of appearance, rather
than drawing from a fixed set of pre-generated resources, the distributed random number
generator we describe in Chapter 5.2.3 could be used. This would reduce the number of
required players to only be those involved in the game and would prevent collusion between
a subset of the peers.
Another P2P protocol for card games is described by Yeh in [Yeh08]. Similar to
[WK05], the author proposes a system based around shared secrets for hiding card se-
lection from other players. Their improvement is based around the improving the run-time
complexity of shared secret maintenance. Unfortunately, this protocol still has the same
limitations as stated earlier. Namely, collusion with the shared secret constructor is still
possible, and at least one player not involved in the game must be present.
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In the ad-hoc P2P networks that our protocol is designed for, we cannot count on relying
on several disinterested players. Also, we would like to eliminate the trusted third-party
peer from the design so that collusion with that player is not possible. Thus, neither of
these schemes for message security are viable solutions for our problem.
2.3.3 Cheating in Games
We define cheating as: any action by a player that circumvents the normal course of actions
in an game that gives the player an unfair advantage in the game or over another player.
Cheats are primarily possible due to security flaws in an application, protocol, or network.
We can create a taxonomy of cheats based on the layer in which they occur [GZLM04],
which is useful when we are considering what we can and cannot prevent at a particular
layer. We note that Yan and Randell [YR05], as well as Kabus and Buchmann [KB07],
have also created classifications of cheating in games. Their techniques differ from the one
we will be using. Table 2.2 lists several common types of cheats and the layers on which
they occur.
Cheats occurring in the first category, the network level, allow players to gain an advan-
tage in the game by exploiting security flaws in network and routing protocols. Cheats oc-
curring at the application level originate from applications modified to act differently then
their original intent. Typically network and application level cheats both occur through
modifying the application, though network cheats specifically target security flaws with the
network protocols. Last, cheats occurring at the game level are cheats that occur in the
game by breaking game rules (possibly by exploiting bugs or sidestepping rules in some
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Cheat Level P2P Client/Server
Denial of Service Network X ?
Fixed Delay Protocol X ?
Timestamp Protocol X ?
Suppressed Update Protocol X
Inconsistency Protocol X
Collusion Protocol & App X X
Secret revealing App X ?
Bots/reflex enhancers App X X
Breaking game rules Game X ?
Table 2.2: A Taxonomy of Cheating: A List of the common forms of cheats performed. Check
marks indicate whether this type of cheat is possible under the listed architecture. Stars
indicate cheats which are partially possible
way). These may also occur by modifying the application, such as adding new beneficial
cards to a deck during play.
Much of the research in cheat prevention in games has looked at preventing protocol
or application level cheats, i.e., those cheats which occur by modifying network protocol
behavior or altering the application in order to gain an unfair advantage. For example,
Baughman and Levine developed asynchronous synchronization, one of the first proto-
cols that prevented some network level cheats [BLL07]. Cronin et al. added pipelining
to the simple lockstep protocol and secured it from several types of cheats introduced by
adding a pipeline to actions [CFJ03]. GauthierDickey et al. developed the NEO proto-
col as a replacement for a simple lockstep protocol that further prevented network level
cheats [GZLM04].
At the application layer, Li et al. described information dissemination strategies that
limit state information exposure to clients [LDM04]. Chambers et al. showed how to
prevent maphacks, a type of information exposure cheat [CFFS05] in real-time strategy
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games. Schluessler et al. showed how to detect when players were using bots, which falls
under application-level cheats [SGJ07].
In this paper, we focus specifically on avoiding or detecting game level cheats in On-
line TCGs, which are those cheats that occur by breaking the rules of the game, specifically
centered around preventing players from inserting/removing cards, seeing the opponent’s
cards, or not fairly shuffling a deck of cards. The original protocol for detecting and pre-
venting cheating was described in [PG11]. An expanded description of the protocol is also
described in [PG12]. We detail this further in Section 5.2.
2.3.4 Network Address Translation and P2P Protocols
Peer-to-peer protocol users invariably have to deal with the problem of Network Address
Translation (NAT). When a client is connecting to a remote endpoint, depending on the
network configuration between the client and the endpoint, the IP address and port number
used by the client can be changed, or translated. The remote endpoint would then respond
to the translated address, which in turn would be translated back to the originating IP and
port.
While this system is fine for user initiated requests, it restricts the ability for remote
peers to initiate unsolicited connections. In a P2P environment, this means that a peer that
is behind a network using NAT would be unavailable for connection. This severely limits
how the peer can interact and participate in the P2P overlay.
There are multiple ways to overcome this problem, such as consistent endpoint trans-
lation in the NAT and TCP hole-punching. In consistent endpoint translation, a predicable
NAT device can be probed to see what translation scheme is being used. This would allow
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a client to “guess” what translated address it will be allocated and have clients connect to
it using the predicted address. In TCP hole-punching, a proxy endpoint outside of the NAT
can serve as a connection arbiter for peers. If peers A and B were tying to connect to each
other, but they were behind a NAT, they could first contact an arbiter C, who would then
know the translated addresses of both A and B. C could then send that information to A
and B so that a direct connection between the peers could be established.
Using these approaches, 80-90% of the peers can successfully connect to each other
[BSK05]. However, this does not account for the case where two users are behind the same
NAT trying to connect to other users. In this case, a third party would need to be used for
relaying port numbers prior to TCP hole-punching.
In M+G, peers are either playing on a disconnected, ad-hoc P2P connection or in a
connected, structured P2P connection. In the first scenario players are directly connected
to each other and do not have to worry about NAT. The second scenario is addressed by our
architecture presented in Chapter 6.
2.4 Scalable Peer-to-Peer Overlay Networks
In order to choose overlays suitable for our hybrid P2P TCG architecture, it is important
to understand the performance characteristics of each type. Included in this section is a
summary of the most popular types of Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) and other forms of
overlay networks available today. Table 2.3 describes the key capabilities of each overlay
that is described in this chapter.
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Name Key Space Query Hops Range Multi-Attribute Locality
CAN DHT O(logN) NO NO YES
Chord DHT O(logN) NO NO NO
Kademlia DHT O(log2bN) NO NO YES
Pastry DHT O(logBN) NO NO YES
SkipNet Skip Lists O(logN) YES NO YES
Mercury Load Balancing O(1/k ∗ log2N) YES YES YES
Table 2.3: Summary of P2P Overlay Capabilities: This table details key information about common
P2P overlays. Information is provided in terms of: key space maintenance, number of
hops worst case when performing a query, whether the overlay supports range queries,
if the overlay supports multi-attribute queries, and if the overlay can be made content or
locality aware
2.4.1 Overview of Peer-to-Peer Networks
A Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network is a collection of client machines that act as both a client
and a server to other clients in the network. Each machine, or node, in the P2P network
have equal responsibility. One of the first uses of a P2P network can be found with Nap-
ster TM [nap], a file-sharing network that focused primarily on sharing music. Another
application can be found with GridCast [CLZ+08], a P2P based video-on-demand system.
Although Napster and GridCast have different goals in terms of functionality, the core goal
of the network is the same: Group nodes into an overlay so that useful operations can be
performed.
2.4.1.1 Peer-to-Peer Overlays
In a naive implementation, a P2P network could be constructed so that every node is con-
nected to every other participating node. This design has an advantage in that no node
is further than one message, or hop away from any other node. The disadvantage to this
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design, however, is found in the number of connections that must be maintained. For each
node in the system, connection information about every other node must be kept. This
means that each node maintains N connections, and there are N2 connections total in the
system. There are two main problems with this design: First, the number of connections
required for each node cannot scale. It is impossible for a client workstation to participate
in thousands of active network connections. Operating system limitations would prevent
such a system from being possible. Second, whenever a node leaves or joins, up to N con-
nection updates must be performed. Given that, as is shown by Gummadi et. al [GDS+03],
the average time a node is connected is ≈ 2.5 minutes, the number of connection updates
that would be performed in a hour is far too great for clients to handle.
To solve this problem, most P2P systems organize nodes into an overlay, or logical
topology of nodes. In a P2P overlay, the interconnections between nodes are maintained
in such a way that different properties of the connectivity graph between them can be used
to optimize different problem sets. As stated above, the optimal number of hops a P2P
overlay could hope for is one. Since that is not possible, most P2P overlays try to balance
the number of connections per node with hop length such that no more than O(logN)
number of hops is required to perform an operation.
2.4.1.2 Distributed Hash Tables
One of the more common classes of P2P overlays are Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs),
a system used to store and lookup data in a decentralized manner. Similar to the Hash
Table data structure, a consistent hashing function is utilized on the ID of the content being
stored, which then provides an indicator as to where to look for the data in the network. All
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nodes participating in the DHT are responsible for a subset of the hash function key space,
and have an associated node ID. The node ID is used to determine the specific subset that
the node will take responsibility for. Typically, keys are either 128 or 160 bytes long.
When searching for data, or inserting data, almost all DHTs use a distance function for
keys to determine how far away a node is from the data it is looking for. It is also used to
determine which neighbor will route the query closer to the goal.
2.4.2 Content Addressable Network
A Content Addressable Network (CAN) is an implementation of a Distributed Hash Table.
The basic premise behind this system is that incoming peers will bootstrap to some known
active node, acquire a segment of the hash table key space from an existing node based on
the incoming node’s ID, and then “own” that space for the purposes of storing keys that
hash to that location, as well as, responding to queries that terminate there. The authors,
in addition to presenting the basic idea of CAN, provide many modifications that seek to
improve various aspects of the CAN’s performance depending on what it is the end user
needs to optimize. Examples of what the authors include are improvements that reduce
virtual path length through the CAN, physical path length in the actual network that is being
overlaid, and replication methods that help with the fault-tolerant nature of the system.
Each node holds a routing table that contains the next hop in routing between CAN
nodes. Entries in the routing table for a node are maintained based on the neighbor list of
that node. A node is considered to be a neighbor if the key space it is responsible either
overlaps or is adjacent to the key space of the CAN node. When a query is routed through a
node and that node is not responsible for the key space requested, the query is hashed into
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the routing table and the IP address stored in that position of the table is the node to which
the query is forwarded.
CAN can route based on multiple dimensions of key space. This allows for queries
based on different indexed properties of the data being stored. Thus, the average routing
length of CAN is d
4
× n 1d where d is the number of dimensions and n is the number of




Chord [SMK+01][LCP+05], another DHT, works by using a distributed consistent hashing
function to guarantee an equal distribution of keys throughout the collection of nodes. This
allows for only a small amount of routing entries be maintained at any node (logarithmic
on the number of nodes, specifically).
The DHT key space in Chord is ordered and organized into a ring. Each participating
node occupies a location in the ring, and holds a finger table that serves as a routing table
for queries. Each entry in the finger table is selected so that, when routing a query, large
sections of the key space ring can be short circuited to optimize the search. The simple
concept of routing is as follows: In order to find the correct node to pass a query to, a node
in the Chord ring forwards the request to the successor node (via the finger table) until
found. A successor node is defined as a node whose ID is larger than the requesting node,
but is smaller than the ID of the item being searched for. Each node is responsible for data
whose ID is greater than or equal to the node’s ID, but are smaller than the ID of the next
node in the ring.
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The average cost of a query in Chord is O(logN), which is the path length required to
route the query to the correct node. Joining and leaving has a cost of O(logN)2 in order to
redistribute keys.
2.4.4 Kademlia
Kademlia [MM02][LCP+05] is a DHT that incorporates XOR operations on node IDs into
its routing algorithm in order to determine distance between peers. Nodes are grouped
according to the concept of a k-bucket, meaning that any query returns the k closest peers
so that the originator can determine a node from which the data will be requested (based
on latency, for example).
The authors show that it is able to withstand some aspects of a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack since the k-bucket system it utilizes for caching nodes is only updated (when full)
after an existing node leaves. Due to this, new nodes cannot flush out existing entries.
Routing is performed in a 160-bit key space with items stored at peers with IDs close to
that of the object, for some definition of close. Expected number of hops grows by log2bn
with a routing table size of 2blog2bn k-buckets per node.
2.4.5 Pastry
Pastry [RD01][LCP+05] is a shortest prefix matching algorithm DHT in which each node
is assigned a 128-bit identifier in a circular key space.
Queries are routed from one node to the next by following the rule that the node you
forward to should have an ID that shares a common prefix that is at least b bits longer
than the current node with the current query. If such a node is not available, the message
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is forwarded to a node that shares the same prefix match, but has a node ID numerically
closer to the ID of the target key.
The average number of steps to route a request grows as O(logBN) where B = 2b with b
being a tunable parameter. As b increases, the number of steps to route a requests decreases,
but the number forwarding table entries required at each node increases by approximately
O(log2BN) ∗ (2b − 1).
2.4.6 SkipNet
SkipNet [HJS+03] is a P2P overlay based on the skip lists data structure. The basic concept
of a skip list is that, if content is inserted into a list ordered by node ID, short-circuit
pointers from each node can be maintained that short circuit, or “skip” a range of nodes
to provide faster search performance. SkipNet’s design can provide content locality as
well as path locality. In this context, content locality refers to the ability to specify which
node, or groupings of node, content should be stored at. Path locality further enhances
the capabilities provided by content locality. This is accomplished by guaranteeing that
messages will not be routed outside of a specified grouping of nodes. By combining both
content and path locality, SkipNet can guarantee that operations on and storage of messages
will remain within a specified grouping of nodes.
In games, there are clear advantages to both content and path locality. As an exam-
ple, take a game in which there are two factions, A and B. In a P2P overlay such as
Chord [SMK+01], a private message between members of faction A could be intercepted
by faction B because of the uniform nature of nodes within the overlay coupled with the
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routing protocol used within it. SkipNet could prevent this scenario by allowing for a path
local overlay that would never route the message outside of A’s domain.
As another example, take for instance different areas, or zones, within a virtual world.
Updates within the zone have no need to be propagated outside of it. In SkipNet, assume
each player, upon entering the zone, changed their name prefix to be the current zone’s
name so that they were placed into the same content-local grouping. It would be a simple
matter then for a user to identify which players to contact in order to send a mass update in
the zone; just send a wildcard range query for all members with the correct zone prefix.
Experimental and theoretical results, included in the author’s work, show that resilience
in the face of network failures is far better than that of both Chord and Pastry. This is
because of the data locality inherent in the SkipNet architecture.
2.4.7 Mercury
Mercury [BAS04] is a scalable query routing and data storage protocol that supports mul-
tiple attribute range style queries. Their implementation is similar in design to a DHT, but
does not use a uniform hashing algorithm. Instead, Mercury explicitly load balances con-
tent amongst nodes in the overlay. This is required in order to support the multi-attribute
query properties of the system. The authors provide many optimizations to their algorithm,
including but not limited to:
• query caching, which helps reduce the number of hops for common queries
• random sampling techniques to approximate system load and balance queries accord-
ingly
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• explicit load balancing algorithms to counteract areas of popularity in key-space
• query selectivity to help reduce query message complexity
The authors also propose an application of Mercury, a publish/subscribe system, for
distributed gaming. The authors show how the built in functionality for Mercury makes this
a straightforward extension to implement. The simulation results for the publish/subscribe
system show that Mercury provides a underlying framework that performs much better than
simple broadcast.
In the context of games, this publish/subscribe systems can have many uses. For ex-
ample, assume once again we are dealing with a player in a virtual world. That player can
subscribe to a global event topic, a topic for the current zone he is in, and even perhaps
subscribe to a topic associated with the guild to which he currently belongs. Any state
change that occurs in those topics would be populated to the character through Mercury,
with the originator of the event only having to send one message.
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Chapter 3
MMO Modeling Methodology and Data
Characterization
In order to accurately model behavior in a virtual world, it is necessary to study several
aspects of a player’s behavior. Although there are many individual data points to collect,
the individual models can be categorized into three groups:
• Player Movement Models
– Player movement, both within a zone (intra-zone) and between zones (inter-
zone)
– Player distributions
– Number of zones visited during a session
• Player Interaction Models
– Player to player interactions
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– Interactions of players with the virtual world
• Temporal Models for Player Behavior
– Session lengths
– Arrival and departure rates
– Time spent in a zone
3.1 Data Collection Methodology
Two primary methods can be used for measuring virtual populations and behaviors of
players in MMORPGs: analyzing logs and data generated from the game server or us-
ing probing-based measurements which try to infer properties of the system. In the first
case, log and data analysis has the advantage of being accurate and providing information
about player behavior that cannot be gathered otherwise. Unfortunately, though, few game
companies are willing to share their logs, and even if they do it is not always the case that
they log the needed information. In the second method, traffic or in-game measurements
are taken to generate the needed data, but this may not be possible if the game client does
not support the needed API. Our dataset was generated through the second method, which
unfortunately prevented observations in the Player Interaction Models category.
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3.1.1 Probing-Based Measurements
In order to measure population information in World of Warcraft (WoW) and Warhammer
Online (WAR), we designed a set of scripts that run from the game clients using the Lua1
scripting interface provided by both games2. For WoW, we modified the Census+ add-on
to collect broad information about all players currently online3. WAR’s add-on was custom
written but was based on functionality of Census+. We also wrote an additional add-on
for both MMORPGs to record continuous detailed information about a randomly selected
subset of players.
3.1.2 Virtual Population Census
To measure the virtual population, we performed server queries from the clients using the
who service, which allows a player to search for another player in the game. Using the who
service, we performed snapshots of the server population every 15 minutes. This allowed
us to record the entire population seen during a measurement.
A ’who’ query actually only returned a small subset of players, but allowed us to use
expressions to narrow our search. These expressions included level restrictions, race re-
strictions, specialization restrictions, and name restrictions. For example, we could query
for all players that were level 40. If the maximum number of players was returned from
the query, we would further restrict the query until a subset fewer than the maximum was
returned. Thus, we could systematically query the server for all players currently in the
game, though each complete census depended on the current population of the server.
1http://www.lua.org
2Source code available from http://www.cs.du.edu/˜chrisg/measurements.
3http://www.warcraftrealms.com/censusplus.php
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A full census of the virtual population could take up to 10 minutes when the server load
was high. During this time, players could leave or join the game and we might possibly miss
them from the census. To understand the amount of population fluctuation we implemented
a back-to-back snapshot where a second census was taken immediately following the first
one. By examining the two censuses, one could measure the overall churn in the game.
3.1.3 Detailed Movement Measurements
Because we did not want to schedule constant censuses and because snapshots of the pop-
ulation took so long, we did not have the granularity we wanted for modeling player move-
ment (i.e., knowing where a player is every 15 minutes leaves a lot of guess-work for what
they did during that long interval). We addressed this issue by using the friends list, which
allows you to have a continual stream of information about where your ’friends’ are cur-
rently playing the game. We populated our friends list with a random subset of players from
the census snapshots. However, because snapshots were only taken every 15 minutes, we
only added friends from the 2nd snapshot who were not in the 1st snapshot since we knew
they had recently logged into the game. In WoW, we were able to maintain a maximum list
of 50 players while in WAR we could have a maximum of 40 players.
The friends list allowed us to track a small subset of players including when they log
on and off and where they are during each query. As ’friends’ logged off, they were re-
placed with new players from the 2nd half of the back-to-back census snapshots, so that we
continually observed a subset of players.
The final set of data underwent a minor cleaning process. Because of the way the Lua
add-ons worked, we had to log out of the game to record the data, which in turn forced our
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measurements to stop once a day to log the information. During the period that we logged
in and out of the game, we might end up with an incomplete snapshot or only one-half of a
back-to-back pair. In our friends list data collection, we might see a player log on, but not
log off because we had logged out of the game to record the data. We simply eliminated
these suspect snapshots and movement collections from the data set.
Using our methodology, we observed over 125, 000 individual players and tracked
player movements on over 75, 000 sessions. The high ratio of random players seen by
tracking them via the friends list indicates the success of our methodology in obtaining a
reasonable sample of players seen from our census. We note that while all MMOs do not
use Lua as a scripting interface for the game client, the who service and friends list tend to
be universal and therefore similar techniques could be applied to other MMOs.
WoW was measured over a 4 month period on the Aerie Peak server while WAR was
measured over 2 weeks on the Volkmar server. We examined data from other servers and it
was similar to the results presented here, thus these two servers are sufficiently general for
both games. The results of the analysis and modeling of our dataset were published both
in Netgames 2007 [PG07] and in MMM 2010 [PG10], though as noted previously, not all
facets of the dataset have been fully explored.
3.2 Data Characterization
Our data is stored in XML using the following schema in Appendix A. Generally, data
points are broken into two parts: snapshots and playerObservations. Each Snapshots entry
contains a sequence of snapshots, each recording the player name, level, guild, location,
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specialization, race and faction. The individual snapshot also contains the start time and
stop (i.e., completion) time of the snapshot.
PlayerObservations contain two timestamps indicating the starting and stopping of a
sequence of observations. Each individual observation consists of a sequence of times and
locations of the given player.
The XML data is currently available in a compressed form at: http://www.cs.du.
edu/˜chrisg/mmoobservations.
3.2.1 Dataset Statistics




Table 3.1: Totals by Faction in Dataset: A breakdown of the total population by faction
The dataset contains a total of 122,361 unique players and 3,205 total guilds with the
breakout by faction and game listed in Table 3.1. General statistics broken down by race
as shown in Figure 3.1. On the Alliance faction, two races were played more prominently
than other races, while on the Horde faction, the distribution was more even. A breakdown
of user population by specialization is shown in Figure 3.2. Note that the last few boxes in
the WAR populations are because WAR has more specializations that WoW. Also note that
















Figure 3.1: Total Unique Players by Race in WoW: Horde and Alliance populations are sorted













Figure 3.2: Total Unique Players by Specialization in WoW and WAR: Total populations are sorted
from most populated to least populated specialization
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The dataset also contains information about levels and guilds, but because the data col-
lection was taken over several months, a player is seen with multiple levels, depending on
how many they played through during the observations. The same issue holds for guilds





As stated earlier, player behavior in MMORPGs can be broken down into three categories:
Movement, Interaction, and Temporal. Our work focuses on providing models for both the
Movement and Temporal categories.
4.1 Player Movement Models
Inside the virtual world in MMORPGs, regions are statically divided into zones. From both
WoW and WAR we measured the zones each player visited (including the order visited).
The goal in modeling this behavior is to see how players move between zones. Some
questions that we want to answer include:
• How many zones do players visit during a session?
• Do players move back and forth between the same zone?
• Are some zones visited more often than others?
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4.1.1 Player Distributions
We started by measuring the distribution of players in the virtual world of both games.
Specifically, we measured how many players are in each zone over the measurement period.
After examining the data, we realized that a large percentage of the zones had 0 players
in them. To model this correctly, we calculated the quantity of 0 population zones we
examined (36.44% in WoW and 78.56% in WAR) and removed these from the data set
for the purpose of modeling the remaining data. We then plotted the remaining points to
cover the probability from 0 to 1. Using the least-squared method, we fit the data using a
Weibull distribution. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the measured data and the fitted Weibull
distributions of the zone populations. Note that in both games, only a few zones have more
than 50 players, while the majority of zones have fewer than 10 players. For WoW, we saw
an average of 121 players in a zone, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 293 players.
On WAR, we saw an average of 74 players in a zone with a maximum of 156 players and
a minimum of 0.
Player distributions were modeled very closely using a Weibull distribution with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.007 for WoW and 0.008 for WAR of the residuals from the measured
data and models. Thus, given a uniformly distributed random number 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, we can
model WoW and WAR population distributions as follows:
PopulationWoW [p] =















Measured Zone Population CDF
Modeled Zone Population CDF
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Players per Zone in WoW: This figure shows the distribution of players














Measured Zone Population CDF
Modeled Zone Population CDF
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Players per Zone in WAR:This figure shows the distribution of players
per zone in WAR. There were 78 zones without players that are not included in the CDF.
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PopulationWAR[p] =
 0 if p ≤ .7856b1− e−(((p−.7856)/.2144)/3.256)0.6417c otherwise
One of the primary uses of the Weibull distribution is failure prediction for devices.
As time increases, the probability of a failure increases according to the parameters of
the Weibull function. Conversely, the probability of functioning correctly decreases over
time. It is this property of decreased likelihood over time that makes Weibull a good fit
for this data. A very high percentage of zones do not have a large user population. Thus,
as population grows, the probability that given zone will contain that population decreases
quickly.
The measurements of player distributions are important because they show that play-
ers are not uniformly distributed in the virtual world. With the exception of Baughman
and Levine, who used real traces from a small networked multiplayer game called XPi-
lot [BL01, XPi], much of the prior research in scalable game architectures has assumed
this. Clearly, given a uniform distribution of players, almost any architecture can be rea-
sonably well-balanced so that it scales well. However, a Weibull distribution indicates that
players tend to group in large numbers in only a few zones, causing stress on any architec-
ture as it has to handle the increased number of interactions between players. Therefore,
game designers and researchers must consider this Weibull distribution of players in which
a few zones contain a large number of players while many zones only have a few (or no)
players when characterizing the potential load on a MMO architecture.
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4.1.2 Number of Zones Visited
We hypothesized that a linear relationship exists between the number of zones visited dur-
ing a session and the session length. To test this hypothesis, we measured how many zones
the players traveled to each session in both WoW and WAR and plotted the results in Fig-
ures 4.3 and 4.4. The number of zones visited are not unique zones, but the total number

























Measured Number of Zones Visited
Model line: 0.070x + 0.831
Figure 4.3: Zones Visited vs. Session Lengths in WoW: This figure shows the number of zones
visited plotted against the session time in minutes in WoW. A simple linear equations is
used to model the data.
From these figures, we see that our hypothesis held for the 80% of session times in both
games, i.e., those 200 minutes and below in WoW and those 100 minutes and below in
WAR. On both graphs, the hypothesis no longer seemed to hold for the highest 20% of the
sessions. One explanation may be that players who are on for long periods of time behave

























Measured Number of Zones Visited
Model line: 0.014x + 1.20
Figure 4.4: Zones Visited vs. Session Lengths in WAR: This figure shows the number of zones
visited plotted against the session time in minutes in WAR. A simple linear equations is
used to model the data.
players who remain idle for longer than 10 minutes. Thus, even these long sessions consist
of active players or bots.
In both cases, we model this behavior using a simple linear equation. For WoW, we
found that the equation y = 0.070x + 0.831 works well while for WAR we found that the
line at y = 0.014x + 1.20 works well. For future work, we plan on exploring how the
longer sessions can be modeled more accurately.
4.1.3 Player Movement
The final aspect we measured with regards to player movement was how players moved
between zones. Our hypothesis was that the random waypoint model of player movement
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is not accurate for MMORPGs. Our results indicate that, instead, a log-normal distribution
of waypoint choices is more accurate.
To model this type of player movement, we examined the zone locations of all of the
players we tracked and recorded where they were from one measurement to the next. We
created a Markov chain of zone to zone player movement from this data. A Markov chain
is represented by a two dimensional matrix where each row represents the probability of a
transition from the row header (or zone in this case) to a given column header (a destination
zone). To visualize the matrix, we created a square image where each pixel represents a
cell in the matrix and is colored gray according to its probability in the table, with black
being a probability of 1 and white a probability of 0. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 shows the result of
this visualization.
In order to create a player movement model, we also wanted to be able to randomly
generate Markov chains that had the same properties as the measured Markov chains. We
found that a log-normal CDF worked well in modeling these probabilities. The results are
seen in Figure 4.7 and 4.8.
The modeled CDFs are defined as follows, where given a uniformly distributed number



















Note that in using this function to create the Markov table would require each line to be
adjusted so that it summed to 1.
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Figure 4.5: Visualization of Markov Chain Probabilities in WoW: This figure is a visualizations
of the Markov chain generated from the measured player movements between zones in
WoW. Higher transition probabilities are shaded darker
The log-normal distribution is a good fit for data that is clustered at the beginning of the
range of possible values, as the function is biased to the right. In the case of zone choice
probability, a vast majority of the choices will always be zero, which makes log-normal
model the data well.
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Figure 4.6: Zones Visited vs. Session Lengths in WAR: This figure is a visualizations of the Markov
chain generated from the measured player movements between zones in WAR. Higher
transition probabilities are shaded darker
4.2 Temporal Models for Player Behavior
For both WoW and WAR we measured the total populations over time, the lengths of each
session observed, and the time spent in each zone. By looking at this data, we seek to
answer the following questions:
• How long does a player stay in a particular zone?




















Figure 4.7: CDF of Markov Chain Probabilities in WoW: This figure shows the modeled log-normal



















Figure 4.8: CDF of Markov Chain Probabilities in WAR: This figure shows the modeled log-normal
CDF of the probabilities from the measured Markov chains in WAR.
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• How often do players arrive and leave the game?
4.2.1 Population Over Time
We measured the total number of players in the game every 15 minutes during our mea-
surement period and averaged the results by hour for each day of the week. Our hypothesis
was that more players were online during evening and weekend hours, due to weekly obli-
gations such as work and school and therefore architectures would need to address these

























Figure 4.9: Average daily population: This figure shows the average daily population of the WoW
server we measured. Players typically play more in the evenings and both earlier and
later on the weekdays. Tuesdays are “patch days”, when server maintenance occurs,
explaining the empty server at that time.
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We note three important aspects of our graphs. First, populations have an average peak
at almost 3600 players. Given the imprecision incurred by the measurement method, we
estimate that a typical World of Warcraft server will support up to 4000 players. Second,
we see that weekend play stands out from weekday play in that the realm experiences a
significantly higher average population earlier in the day. This implies that servers must
be provisioned for weekend play. Last, we see an almost 5-fold increase in the number of
players from the lowest point (at 4AM) to the highest point (7PM) of the realm population.
This implies that servers must also be over-provisioned to handle peak loads during the
evenings and are only partially loaded during the early mornings.
4.2.2 Arrival and Departure Rates
To further understand the population fluctuations and to help understand the amount of
churn that occurs in a MMORPG, we measured the number of arrivals and number of
departures per hour and averaged this again on each day of the week. Figures 4.10 and 4.11
show these results.
In these two figures, we see that the amount of churn, or the number of players joining
and leaving the game, is high during peak playing times. Figure 4.10 shows similar trends
of arrivals during the weekdays, but has an increased arrival rate on the weekends during
earlier hours of the day. Figure 4.11 shows that the number of departures increases towards
the end of the day. Together, we see that during peak playing times, over 1,000 players join
and leave the game per hour.
In terms of the magnitude of the difference between minimum and maximum arrival































Figure 4.10: Arrival Rates in WoW: This figure shows the arrival rate in terms of the number of



























Figure 4.11: Departure Rates in WoW: This figure shows the departure rate in terms of the number
of players seen in the prior hour that are no longer online in WoW.
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tor of 10. In terms of MMO architectures, 1,000 players joining and leaving per hour may
not appear to be a huge burden. However, given that WoW claims to have over 10 million
subscriptions, a theoretical maximum of 4,000 players per realm indicates that approxi-
mately 1 million players log on and off per hour of the WoW servers. This is a significant
amount of churn that a MMORPG architecture would need to handle. Each time a player
logs on or off, there is overhead associated with establishing and releasing connections. In
addition, notifications must be sent to all remaining players within the immediate area that
the player left or joined the game. Finally, any clients that have registered for updates about
that player must be notified.
4.2.3 Session Lengths
Session lengths were measured by adding a random subset of players seen in the most
recent snapshot to the friends list, allowing us to track how long a character is played in the
game. Our measurements in Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show that contrary to anecdotal stories,
most sessions were short lived.
Figure 4.12 shows the CDF calculated from all observed session times in WoW. From
this figure, we see that only a small percentage of players we observed played for longer
than 400 minutes (≈ 8 hours), while most players played for less than 200 minutes (≈ 3
hours). We calculated the mean session time to be 80 minutes, with a maximum observed
session time of 1440 minutes (24 hours) and a minimum session time of 1 second. Note that
we did not track players for longer than 24 hours, though for future work we will consider
how many players were online for extensive periods of time.
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Figure 4.13 shows the CDF calculated from all sessions observed in WAR. In WAR,
almost 90% of all sessions were less than 200 minutes with a mean session time of 89
minutes, a maximum time of 882 minutes (14 hours), and a minimum session time of 1
second.
For both models, we used the least-squares method to find a fit for a model of the
measured data. Similar to what we found with zone populations, given the trend of the
data, we determined that a Weibull distribution would fit well. The models are plotted in



















Measured Session Time CDF
Modeled Session Time CDF
Figure 4.12: WoW Session Times Observed: This figure shows the CDF of all the sessions we
recorded in WoW. In addition, the data was fit to a Weibull distribution, and plotted on
the same graph. Both lines in the figure are barely distinguishable due to the close fit
of the model.
Next, we validated our models by plotting the residuals between the predicted and
measured values, and found that the residuals for both models had a standard deviation















Measured Session Time CDF
Modeled Session Time CDF
Figure 4.13: WAR Session Times Observed: This figure shows the CDF of all the sessions recorded
in WAR along with the model created by fitting the data to a Weibull distribution. Both
lines in the figure are barely distinguishable due to the close fit of the model.
variable 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the session lengths for WoW and WAR can be modeled as follows:
SessionWoW [x] = 1− e−(x/69.75)
0.7522
, SessionWAR[x] = 1− e−(x/59.81)
0.8322
This result verifies that MMORPGs experience considerable churn. A large fraction
of sessions are short lived while only a small fraction are stable. We believe that what
may be happening here is that players may be logging on to check to see if friends or
guild members are currently online, checking in-game mail, or checking auctions at the
auction house. If this is true, then the implication is that load on an architecture could be
reduced by providing an external interface to these services that does not require logging
into the game. Given the predictability of player session time, one may conclude that game
developers should target playing experiences for session times that reach the majority of
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players. Researchers, on the other hand, can use session times to predict how long players
will connect to a given architecture.
4.2.4 Time in Zones
We then observed the distribution of time that players spend in any given zone. This infor-
mation is important because it helps us understand whether players spend an even amount
of time in each zone or perhaps spend only a small amount of time in a majority of zones
but a large amount of time in one or two zones. Figure 4.14 and 4.15 shows the measured
and modeled CDFs of the time players spend in a zone in both WoW and WAR. As with
session times, the time in each zone also followed a Weibull distribution, indicating that
players did in fact spend most of there time in a few zones, and a small amount of time in
the rest of the zones they visited. These distributions are as follows:
ZoneT imeWoW [p] = 1− e−(x/8.189)
0.5674
, ZoneT imeWAR[p] = 1− e−(x/24.42)
0.6669
As with the previous models, we measured the residuals between the measured and
modeled data and found that the standard deviation of the WoW function was 0.009 and for
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Measured Time in Zone CDF
Modeled Time in Zone CDF
Figure 4.14: Time Spent in a Zone in WoW: This figure shows the measured and modeled CDFs of
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Figure 4.15: Time Spent in a Zone in WAR: This figure shows the measured and modeled CDF




Peer-to-Peer Trading Card Game
Protocol
Trading card games (TCGs), also known as collectible card games, are a type of card game
where players purchase, collect, or trade cards, allowing them to create a playing deck
from their collection which can be used to compete with other players. Cards in the game
have different features or abilities and may be used strategically and in conjunction with
other cards in their deck. An example of the fields used in a trading card are shown in
Figure 5.1. Each card has associated abilities, costs, attack power, and defense power.
Higher attack power cards can do more damage to another player, but generally have much
higher associated costs. Cards with smaller defense values might cost less, but can be
destroyed more easily.
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Figure 5.1: An example of the fields in a trading card: This picture shows some of the example
fields present in a trading card
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Recently, TCGs have started to move to the computer game realm and typically use
client/server architectures, primarily because a centralized system is needed for handling
game transactions and because servers can act as a referee for game play, thereby preventing
players from cheating. The question naturally arises: can TCGs be played without cheating
in a purely peer-to-peer fashion? We present a protocol showing that this is indeed possible.
In designing a protocol for online TCGs, player expectations must be considered. Two
players competing against each other typically have the following expectations:
• They expect to be able to play their TCG wherever and whenever they want
• They expect that the other player cannot easily cheat without being caught
• They expect to be able to play instant-type cards, which are cards played in response
to an opponent’s card(s) and are usually played in rapid succession between players
From these requirements, we have designed a peer-to-peer protocol called Match+Guardian
which, unlike a client/server protocol:
• Allows players to play with ad-hoc network connections since they do not rely on
Internet connectivity to a server
• Is extremely scalable since servers are not required to arbitrate the games
• Either prevents an opponent from cheating in the game or at minimum detects and
provably shows the opponent has cheated
• Provides low-latency interaction, which facilitates TCGs with instant-speed cards
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Peer-to-peer protocols typically introduce the problem of cheating when used with
games and further due to network address translation (NAT), peers may have difficulty con-
necting to each other. Modern trading card games may in fact consist of several styles of
play, including sealed-deck tournament games, draft games, and constructed deck games.
We decompose these types of games into a primary sets of actions: from randomly and
fairly generating decks of cards, to ensuring that any card played came from a deck that
was fixed prior to when play commenced. We then show how to securely perform these
steps in a peer-to-peer manner so that all styles of play can be supported. We discuss work
in this area in Chapter 2.3.4.
One might assume that the problems in TCGs are exactly those in the game of mental
poker [SRA81], a fictional game where two people can play poker without seeing each
other’s cards (e.g., over a phone without a built-in video camera). However, TCGs are
different in that the deck of cards is not shared between players, which nicely side-steps the
impossibility results of mental poker. Further, TCGs typically have different types of rules
of play and therefore require slightly different techniques to prevent cheating.
As with many card games, most TCGs do not have specific time limits for playing
individual cards to resolve a turn, except those limits associated with social norms. While
players do expect to be able to play instant cards quickly in response to another card,
in general the timeframe for playing an individual card is longer than that in most other
types of games. This gives TCGs some advantage in preventing cheating since certain
types of cheats no longer apply when time constraints are not as tightly bound as other
genres of games. For example, research in the past has looked at cheating in specific
types of games such as role-playing, first-person shooters, and real-time strategy games
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[BLL07, CFFS05, GZLM04]. However, this prior work does not address cheating within
the actual game, such as, by not actually shuffling cards, or choosing your most desired
card instead of the next one from the top of your deck. In particular, we see that many
of the issues related to cheating in TCGs can be solved by securely and fairly generating
random numbers. This is mainly because TCGs rely on random generation of decks and
the fair shuffling of those decks for play.
M+G is concerned primarily with preventing or catching cheating within the game play
of the TCG. We further propose a more complete architecture with additional services,
some of which are necessarily client/server, and include a centralized repository of the
entire collection of cards and a centralized store service to securely purchase cards. We
describe this architecture in Chapter 6.
For M+G to be viable as a P2P protocol for TCGs, its performance must allow a game
to be played at the same pace that players using a physical TCG would play. We compare
the performance of our implementation of M+G on the AndroidTM platform to real-world
measurements of a popular TCG and we also benchmark its performance in terms of latency
and time. Our results show that M+G works well on modern mobile devices and would
allow players to play P2P TCGs.
5.1 Play Styles
In modern trading card games, there are multiple styles of play. For each style, there
are different steps and techniques associated with them. When referring to the different
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gameplay steps, play styles, and card selection techniques, it is important to be clear on the
terminology involved.
5.1.1 Definitions
1. Universe deck (Du) - The set of all cards that exist in the game. This set is defined
by the designer of the trading card game.
2. Base deck (Db) - The set of all cards a player owns and is therefore authorized to
use during a gameplay session. Note that, Db ⊆ Du, since any card outside of the
universe deck cannot exist. Each player has their own base deck, determined by their
purchases or trades.
3. Play deck (Dp) - The set of cards from their base deck a player has selected to use
during this gameplay session. The play deck must be a subset of the base deck, thus
Dp ⊆ Db ⊆ Du. The play deck is typically constructed ahead of time based on the
synergies of using particular cards together.
5.1.2 Styles of Play
In modern trading card games, play styles can be divided into the following common forms:
1. Sealed deck, where each player begins with a fresh random set of cards. The random
set of cards becomes the player’s base deck for the duration of the session.
2. Identical deck, where each player begins with an identical set of cards. These cards
become the player’s base deck for the duration of the session.
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3. Draft deck, where each player drafts, or picks, cards from a random set of cards.
The drafted cards become the player’s base deck for the duration of the session.
4. Constructed deck, where each player has already purchased, collected, or traded
cards to create their base deck from which a subset of cards are chosen to construct a
play deck.
Although the gameplay styles of these three forms are unique, the individual steps that
compose these styles have significant overlap. By decomposing these styles into discrete
securable steps, we can reduce the problem space, allowing us to present a common so-
lution for each kind of problem faced by these different play styles. Note that from these
common steps, new gameplay styles can be crafted.
5.1.3 Sealed Deck Play
In a sealed deck game, each player is given an unopened deck of cards which is used to
strategically construct a play deck prior to the actual match. This set of cards represents the
player’s base deck. Sealed deck games come from tournaments, where the idea is that if
the decks are chosen randomly (consisting of some distribution of common, rare and very
rare cards), then the matches are more representative of the skills of the players. Beyond
this initial step in creating the play deck, sealed deck games are similar to constructed play
styles. In the online equivalent of this type of game, a randomly generated deck of k cards
(from the entire universe of cards) must be chosen fairly for each player. The securable
steps needed to play this game are described in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Securable Steps Needed to Support Sealed Deck Play
1. Randomly generate a set of cards from the universe deck to represent each player’s
base deck. Typically a server would perform the random deck generation, but in a
peer-to-peer system, the protocol must handle this step.
2. Have each player select a play deck from their base deck in a verifiable manner.
3. Draw a card at random from the play deck. This simulates the step of shuffling cards.
4. Verify when a card is played, that it came from the set of that players’ play deck.
5.1.4 Identical Deck Play
In an identical deck game, each player is given a copy of the same deck of cards which
is used to strategically construct a play deck prior to the actual match. This set of cards
represents the player’s base deck. The identical deck game’s origins also come from tour-
naments, and are a modification on the sealed deck style of play. In this scenario, in addition
to testing the player’s ability to create an effective play deck given a predetermined set of
cards, there is the added component of knowing the opponent’s base deck. This increases
the skill required to be effective because the player needs to construct a deck that is effective
at countering a known set of cards.
Beyond the initial step of creating the play deck, identical deck games are similar to
constructed play styles. In the online equivalent of this type of game, a randomly generated
deck of k cards (from the entire universe of cards) must be chosen fairly, and then be given
to each player. The securable steps needed to play this game are described in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Securable Steps Needed to Support Identical Deck Play
1. Randomly generate one set of cards from the universe deck to represent the base deck
from which each player will receive a copy. The only differences between this step
in identical deck play and the step in sealed deck play is that only one set of random
numbers need be generated, and that after the numbers are generated they can be
revealed to all players for use.
2. Have each player select a play deck from their base deck in a verifiable manner.
3. Draw a card at random from the play deck. This simulates the step of shuffling cards.
4. Verify when a card is played that it came from the set of that players’ play deck.
5.1.5 Draft Deck Play
In draft deck play, each player participates in N draft steps. In each draft step, a player
starts with draft deck consisting of a small number of random cards from the universe deck.
The player then selects one card from this deck and passes the deck to the next player. This
“select and pass” step repeats until all cards are selected, at which point the next draft step
starts, except with the order of passing reversed. After all draft steps have completed, each
player uses their drafted cards as their base deck and then constructs a play deck from it.
The securable steps needed to play this game are described in Algorithm 3.
5.1.6 Constructed Deck Play
Constructed play is a game where each player creates a play deck by strategically choosing a
subset of cards from their base deck and then plays according to the card game rules. Their
base deck consists of all cards which they have purchased or traded with other players.
Verification that a player owns a particular card can be achieved by verifying the signature
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Algorithm 3: Securable Steps Needed to Support Draft Deck Play
1. Randomly generate N sets of cards from the universe deck to represent each player’s
starting draft deck each draft round. Note that this problem can be reduced to holding
N rounds of the random base deck generation step used in the sealed deck play style.
2. Pass a player’s draft deck to another player in a verifiable manner. This verification
is similar to the verification of a card during gameplay. The main difference is that
all cards are verified at once instead of one at a time as they are played.
3. Have each player select a play deck from their base deck in a verifiable manner.
4. Draw a card at random from the play deck. This simulates the step of shuffling cards.
5. Verify when a card is played that it came from the set of that player’s play deck.
from a purchasing authority. Constructed games represent those games where players or
friends compete with each other. The securable steps needed to play this game are described
in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Securable Steps Needed to Support Constructed Deck Play
1. Have each player select a play deck from their base deck in a verifiable manner.
Selecting a play deck from a player’s collection is a simplification of the problem of
selecting a play deck from a randomly generated deck, so this problem can be solved
similarly.
2. Draw a card at random from the play deck. This simulates the step of shuffling cards.
3. When a card is played, verify that it came from the set of that player’s play deck.
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5.1.7 Required Securable Steps for Preventing Cheating in TCGs
Now that we have enumerated the popular play styles and their individual steps, we can
create a master list of securable play steps for online trading card games:
• Randomly generate a set of cards from the universe deck to represent each player’s
base deck (or draft deck).
• Pass a player’s base deck (or draft deck) to another player in a verifiable manner.
• Have each player select a play deck from their base deck in a verifiable manner.
• Draw a card at random from the play deck.
• Verify when a card is played that it came from the set of that player’s play deck.
With this common securable framework, game designers could mix and match game
steps to create completely new styles of play, allowing flexibility in the game style. We
acknowledge that while this list may not be completely comprehensive for creating all
possible game styles, it may be possible to add new securable steps using similar ideas to
those presented here.
5.2 Protocols
For each of the play steps which must be secured, we have developed an appropriate method
to ensure that a player cannot cheat in that step. Composing a game from these steps leads
to a particular play style. We begin by describing our assumptions, notation, the list of
threats we are attempting to prevent, and then detail the protocols individually.
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5.2.1 Preliminaries
In order for our protocols to work successfully, we make a few important but reasonable
assumptions. First, each player has a unique identifier. Second, the size of the universe
deck in the TCG is n. Without a loss of generality, we assign the numbers 1...n as unique
identifiers for each card. Third, we assume that since duplicates of each card in the set
of cards can exist in a player’s deck of cards, each valid card has a second number from
1...m. When a player purchases a card from a company, this card first has its unique identi-
fier, and second has this monotonically increasing sequence number (1...m) depending on
how many of that card the player owns. Cards are then signed by the company with both
numbers and with the player’s unique identifier to prove that they were purchased legally.
5.2.1.1 Notation
We use the letter U to indicate the entire universe of cards in the trading card game, where
|U | is the number of cards in the set. H(i) is the cryptographically secure hash of i while
EA(i) is i encrypted by A (usually Alice in this case). A digital signature of i is noted as
SA(i). Recall that SA(i) = EA(H(i)). As such, SA(i) does not reveal any information
about i but can be held as proof that i was the value when i is either revealed (i.e., if using a
public-key cryptography system) or if the key KA was revealed with i since KA(SA(i)) =
H(i) and the cryptographic hash functions are known to all parties.
In certain messages, a nonce is used. A nonce is a one time use randomly generated
number that is including during signature creation. The gain in using it is twofold. First,
any malicious third party listening to communications between peers will be unable to tell
if an identical message is sent, as the nonce will be unique each time. Second, if a third-
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Field Purpose
cuid Card ID: each card must be distin-
guished from another card by an ID
sn Sequence number: each duplicate card
a player owns has an increasing se-
quence number
pid Player ID: each player has a unique
identifier, which is attached to the card
on purchase
Sc Company digital signature: each card
is signed, after a purchase, by the game
company
Table 5.1: Fields in a digital version of a trading card for M+G.
party agent tries to replay a message, it can be detected, as no two messages should be
identical.
Sc(cuid, sn, pid) indicates a card which is digitally signed by the company (Sc), with its
card unique identifier (cuid), its purchased sequence number (sn) and the player’s unique
identifier (pid). sn, the number, is not unique, but the signed tuple Sc(cuid, sn, pid) is a
unique tuple. Table 5.1 lists the contents of a digital trading card. Note that the functionality
of a card is distributed by the game company with the purchase of a game, so it need not be
included.
5.2.2 Threat Model
For our threat model, we assume a typical computationally-bounded adversary, capable of
injecting packets and passive listening. We assume standard cryptography will prevent the
attacker from decrypting packets in a reasonable amount of time (i.e., before the end of the
game). Peer-to-peer TCGs are susceptible to the following types of threats:
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1. Unfairness in Card Selection - We must be sure that while cards are generated for
a player, that the player cannot unfairly influence the outcome of that operation. For
example, during the generation of a random deck for a sealed deck game, we must
prevent a player from influencing the set of cards generated for the random deck.
2. Discovery of Private Information - We must ensure that an opponent cannot garner
private data concerning which cards another player has. We must enforce this both
during the information exchanges needed in the setup of the game, as well as during
the running of a gameplay session.
3. Changing Cards at Playtime - As with a real TCG, players cannot be allowed to
add or remove cards from their play deck during game play. Thus, any played card
must be verifiable during game play, to prove that it was actually a card from the
player’s play deck.
4. Collusion - The mechanism developed for generating and verifying cards must be
resistant to collusion. Group operations (such as generating a random base deck)
must be performed in such a way as to mitigate the case where some, but not all, of
the players in the game are attempting to influence the outcome.
5. Replay - We must be able to prevent an adversary from replaying moves they eaves-
dropped on so that they cannot fool another player into thinking that the replayed
packet is a cheating attempt by the originator of the move.
To verify if specific game rules (such as how cards behave) are violated or not, each
player must keep a log of the game. Since each card is identified and digital signatures are
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used with moves, one can prove if a player cheats by their signed invalid actions during
gameplay. However, for a log system to work, an additional sequence number is required
for each move in a match so that a total ordering on the TCG moves can be identified.
5.2.3 Securely Generating a Base Deck
We begin by describing how Alice and Bob fairly generate a random base deck from a
universe deck in a pure distribution fashion. This deck forms the basis for providing a
sealed deck for the sealed deck game style, and the base decks for the draft play styles.
Algorithm 5 describes the process.
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for Securely Generating a Base Deck
1. Alice randomly generates a private number iA and a public number jA.
2. Alice signs her private number and only sends the signature SA(iA, nonce) to Bob.
Recall from our notation that this is simply Alice’s digital signature of the tuple
(iA, nonce) and does not include the actual values.
3. Bob randomly generates a private number iB and a public number jB.
4. Bob signs his private number and gives SB(iB, nonce) to Alice.
5. Alice and Bob exchange the tuples (jA, SA(jA)) and (jB,
SB(jB)). In other words, they exchange their public numbers and sign those numbers
(so that they cannot later argue that they gave different public numbers).
6. Alice XORs jB with iA to create a new random number, kA, while Bob XORs jA
with iB to create kB.
7. The unique identifier of Alice’s card from U is kA mod |U |, while kB mod |U | is
Bob’s first card from U .
73
At any step, either of the players may refuse to continue. For example, after Alice gives
Bob her SA(iA) for a particular card, she may wait for Bob’s SB(jB) in step 5, but not give
her SA(jA) to Bob. If so, Bob can simply refuse to continue playing as nothing (but time)
has been lost. As with the coin-flipping protocol, Alice cannot choose her iA in such a way
so that the resulting kA is a card that she wants because she does not know jB before she has
encrypted and sent iA to Bob. The same holds for Bob’s choice of jB—he cannot influence
kA so that Alice gets a poor card from the deck because he cannot identify iA. Thus, Alice
and Bob can fairly and randomly choose a card from U to be part of their tournament deck.
The above sequence of steps can be repeated k times so that each player has a base deck
of k cards. However, the players can speed up the processes by generating a sequence of
private and public numbers. In the first step, Alice generates k private numbers i1A...ikA
and public numbers j1A...jkA. Bob does the same thing for private and public numbers.
In the second and fourth steps, each private number is signed individually (instead of en-
crypting the entire sequence). The values and nonces are revealed as the cards are played
to show that they indeed came from the base deck of k cards.
At this point, Alice and Bob have base decks consisting of k cards. Figure 5.2 diagrams
the flow of steps for random card selection.
5.2.4 Play Deck Creation with a Generated Base Deck
Once a base deck of k cards has been generated, Alice and Bob must typically choose a
subset of s cards from the base deck to form their play deck. Note that Alice and Bob
choose cards for their play deck strategically as certain cards may work better with other











Figure 5.2: Random Card Selection: This diagram shows how Bob and Alice can participate in
random number selection in a verifiable manner while not revealing information about
their random number to each other
have exactly the same sized play deck). For strategic reasons they may choose to construct
a larger (for more variety) or smaller (for a higher probability of certain cards) deck.
The primary rule for creating the play deck is that it must be done entirely before the
game begins. One cannot add cards to the play deck from the base deck during gameplay.
Thus, the following steps must occur to fairly choose the play deck:
• Alice chooses a card for her play deck. Recall that Bob sent her k public numbers for
each of the k cards in her base deck. Alice sends SA(p, SA(p)) where p corresponds
to the order of the 1...k values Bob sent to her. For example, if the card she chose
for her play deck was selected by XORing her 5th private number with his 5th public
number, she sends SA(5, SA(5)) to Bob. Alice repeats this for every card she adds
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to her play deck from her base deck. This prevents Bob from knowing Alice’s play
deck.
• Bob chooses a card for his play deck, sending Alice the tuple SB(p, SB(p)) for his
chosen card, where p is the order of the public values corresponding to the card he
chose. Bob repeats this step for every card he adds to his play deck from his base
deck.
Choosing the play deck must occur before gameplay begins and both Alice and Bob
may create their decks simultaneously, though order does not matter in this case. When
Alice or Bob play a card from their play deck, they reveal the associated private number and
the order value (which they sent to represent each card). For example, when Alice plays the
card that was chosen by Bob’s 5th public number, Alice sends the tuple (5, i5, SA(5, i5)) to
Bob. As Bob knows his 5th public value was previously sent the hash of Alice’s 5th private
value, he can calculate the hash of i5 to see if it matches the previously sent hash. Also, he
can XOR i5 with his 5th public number to determine the cuid of the card and verify that
the correct card was played. Finally, he can verify the hash of (5, SA(5)) against what was
sent during the play deck creation phase.
A diagram describing the process of selecting a card from the base deck is shown in
Figure 5.3.
5.2.5 Play Deck Creation with a Non-Generated Base Deck
In styles such as constructed deck play, the base deck of the player is not generated ran-
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Figure 5.3: Play Deck Selection From Generated Base Deck: This diagram shows how Alice can
be informed what cards Bob is selecting from his generated base deck for his play deck
ahead of time without revealing the value of the card
ter 5.2.4. Instead, all the player needs to do is send a signed hash of the card id and
sequence number of the card they intend to include in their play deck to the other player.
For instance, if Alice is sending to Bob that she intends to use the second copy of card 12,
she would send SA(12, 2, nonce) to Bob. This allows Alice to commit to using a card from
her base deck without revealing what it is to Bob. He must know her base deck, however,
so that the ordering of cards can be known.
5.2.6 Drawing a Card from the Play Deck
Once a play deck has been created, we need to ensure that when a player chooses a card
randomly from their deck during gameplay that the card they chose is truly random. In a
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physical game, the decks are shuffled and opponents may even cut the cards to introduce
additional randomness. Players in fact typically want their cards shuffled so that they get
an even distribution of various types of resource cards while playing as they cannot predict
how the game will unfold. However, since the players cannot observe each other during
play, we have to ensure that we get the equivalent of a deck shuffle without cheating. The
protocol for this scenario is described in Algorithm 6:
Algorithm 6: Protocol for Shuffling Play Deck
1. Alice’s play deck, consisting of p cards are shuffled. Recall that she has already told
Bob which cards are in her play deck, and can refer to them by their pth order value.
2. For each card in her deck, Alice sends SA(p, nonce) to Bob.
3. Bob further shuffles the deck to ensure that Alice shuffled it properly. When Alice
needs a card, she simply asks Bob for the next one, which he sends.
Bob repeats the procedure for his play deck, so that Alice can ensure his cards are
shuffled. When either player plays a card, they can reveal the values (p, nonce) so that the
other player can verify that the card is not still in his or her deck, from which cards are
being dealt.
5.2.7 Playtime Verification with a Generated Base Deck
Playtime verification of cards from a generated base deck is a two step process. First, the
card has to be determined to be in the set of legitimately selected cards. Second, the card
has to be verified as a card that exists in the play deck.
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Since both Alice and Bob know the set U , and hence all the cards have unique iden-
tifiers, it suffices for a player to reveal the kth private value with its associated nonce to
the other player which the other player can then XOR with the kth public value and match
the unique identifier with the card just played. For example, Alice plays a card that was
generated from the 5th public number, (j5B, SB(j5B)), which Bob gave to her. When she
plays the card, she also sends (i5, nonce5), SA(i5, nonce5) to Bob. Using i5 and nonce5,
Bob can check to see if this was the same value that Alice gave to him previously. If not, he
knows she is cheating and has proof of it since he already has her hash of HA(i5, nonce5)
that she sent in step 2.
A diagram describing the process of verifying that a card came from a player’s ran-








Figure 5.4: Playtime Verification Flow From a Generated Base Deck: This diagram shows how
Alice can verify a card played by Bob is part of the base deck that was generated,
allowing for real-time verification of correctness in gameplay
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To verify that the card being played comes from the play deck, Alice sends the tuple
(p, SA(p)) where p indicates the order of the commitment step that declared that card. Since
she has already told Bob what order values she was using previously, he can easily verify
if she is lying or not about its real value.
5.2.8 Playtime Verification From a Non-Generated Base Deck
In the case of a non-generated base deck, playtime verification of cards is a two step pro-
cess. First, the card has to be verified as existing in the play deck. Second, the ownership
of the card by the player must be validated.
Since Alice and Bob have both committed earlier the card ID and sequence numbers
of the cards they intend to use when declaring their play deck, they can simply verify that
information. For example, say that Alice plays her first copy of card 11 in her base deck.
When she plays the card, she would also send (11, 1, nonce 11 1), SA(11, 1, nonce 11 1)
to Bob. He can then verify that the hash computed from the given values matches what was
declared by Alice in the play deck creation step and that the value has not been seen before.
Once the verification of the play is complete, the purchasing authority’s signature can
be verified to prove ownership of that card by the player.
5.2.9 Passing a Base Deck to Another Player
When a base deck (or draft deck) is passed amongst players, it is important to make sure
that the deck of cards being passed is not changed. Assuming the decks being passed were
generated using the algorithms described above, verification occurs when the private values
used to choose the base deck are revealed. Note that this occurs only when using the Draft
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Deck or Sealed Deck play styles. For example, Alice who generated a random base deck
would reveal all the k private numbers i1A...ikA.
With multiple players, revealing the private numbers for the randomly generated base
decks does not leak information, as all players must know all finalized base decks before
play begins. Furthermore, a player cannot insert a new card for this exact same reason.
5.3 Evaluation
In order to better understand the performance characteristics of our protocol we have de-
signed a realistic set of success criteria under which M+G must perform. First, we ob-
served people playing Magic the GatheringTM, a popular TCG, and modeled the time it
took players to perform certain actions. These results serve as a benchmark to compare the
performance of M+G against. Second, we designed a simulation environment using the
AndroidTM development platform. Given the proliferation of mobile games, and the very
likely scenario that someone might be in an environment in which they have access to a
mobile device without an Internet connection, we thought this platform appropriate. By
comparing the performance of our simulation with real measurements of a popular TCG,
we demonstrate that M+G can indeed be used for peer-to-peer trading card games.
5.3.1 Observed Behavior
There is little work done to date in the area of modeling player behavior in TCGs, so we de-
cided to start with the most basic sample set we could: real-life behavior. While observing
players, our goal was to focus on the time it took to perform the following activities:
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• Draw a card from their deck
• Play a card from their hand
• End their turn
To gather these times, we video-recorded people playing Magic the GatheringTM. After
the game was complete, we measured the time of the players’ actions to derive a model
for comparison with our simulations. The cumulative distribution function of the measured
turn lengths is shown in Figure 5.5. From this, we can see that even short turns last close















Time for a player to complete their turn (seconds)
Figure 5.5: Observed Turn Times: This graph shows the CDF of turn lengths throughout the ob-
served gameplay session.
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the lengths of drawing cards and playing cards. From these
figures we see that drawing a card typically ranges from 1 to 4 seconds in duration while
playing a card ranges from just over .5 seconds to 5 seconds. Note that the fidelity of
measurements were at 1/30th of a second (i.e., we could advance frame by frame), though
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the margin of error was likely several video frames, due to the subjectiveness of determining
when a player was starting or finishing the drawing or playing of a card.
By measuring how long it takes a player to draw and play a card, we can identify the
range of time available for our protocol to encode, transmit, and validate a message. As
long as we can perform those tasks within the window that is represented by our modeled
user behavior, there would be no greater perceived delay to the user than they would expect




















Figure 5.6: Observed Card Drawing Times: This graph of all measured times for drawing a card
from the play deck.
5.3.2 Simulation
Once we had a set of evaluation criteria we designed a Peer-to-Peer simulation using the























Figure 5.7: Observed Card Playing Times: The graph of all measured times for playing a single
card.
and has a large user community, which made it ideal for us to develop a reference imple-
mentation that can be distributed widely.
The simulation was run under an AndroidTM emulation environment in which each
client’s OS reported a BogoMIPS (an artificial benchmark of system performance) of
287.53. By comparison, the Motorola Droid RazrTM reports a BogoMIPS of 1996.68.
Therefore, we consider the emulation environment to be representative of a low-end smart
phone with worse-case performance characteristics. For asymmetric encryption and signa-
tures we used SHA-256 and RSA with a 1280 bit key. For symmetric encryption we used
AES with a 128 bit key.
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5.3.3 Results
After running the simulation and processing the video data, we produced combined graphs
of two of the performance metrics we were interested in: card draw time and card play
time.
In the card draw time graph shown in Figure 5.8 our simulation clearly beats the per-
formance requirements of the observed game, in most cases by over a full second. In
particular, 90% of the samples from our simulation were able to complete the card draw-
ing operation in under 1.5 seconds. In comparison, only about 30% of the observed card















Time to deal a card (seconds)
Simulation
Observed
Figure 5.8: Card Draw Time Comparison: This graph shows a comparison of the distribution of
times to draw cards between our simulation and observed play behavior
In the play time graph displayed in Figure 5.9 once again our simulation was able to
outperform the observed behavior, in some cases by several seconds. When players actually
played cards, 95% of the time, they took between 1 and 5 seconds. However, M+G was
















Time to play a card (seconds)
Simulation
Observed
Figure 5.9: Card Play Time Comparison: This graph shows a comparison of the distribution of
times required to play a card
The results of our analysis is promising and shows that it is possible, given the current
state of technology, to implement the encryption required by our protocol while still realiz-
ing a performance model that is consistent or better than how players perform in real life.
However, we acknowledge that user expectation is hard to judge. In particular, players typ-
ically have different expectations of response times when they’re reading human cues, such
as when physically playing a game, than when they’re playing using a computer interface.
They might be more willing to wait for an opponent to play a card when they can visibly
tell that the other player is thinking of a move. In a networked game, this is not the case.
It is important to note, however, that the cryptography performed in our simulation was
done so on very low-end hardware on a mobile device. With a more modern device, the
expectation is that the signature and verification operations would run much faster, and
perform in a fraction of the time observed in our simulation.
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5.3.4 Understanding and Improving M+G’s Performance
Although our initial results show a promising picture in terms of performance, our dataset
representing real-life behavior is limited. In addition, user perception varies greatly, and
delays should always be as short as possible. In order to mitigate these concerns, we need
to break down both the communication and computation requirements of the protocol so
that we can better understand the critical performance areas in our design. Once we do
that, we can present optimizations to our protocol, so that if future data shows an increased
demand for performance, we can address that concern.
5.3.4.1 Communication Requirement
During gameplay, a message is sent by the player each time they announce that they are
playing a card. That message contains, both, information about the card being played and
information about how that card was committed to by the player during the initialization of
the game. The response from the opponent is either a positive message indicating the play
was accepted or a negative message indicating that cheating was detected and the game will
end. Details about the format of the play card message in a play style where the base deck
is generated is shown in Table 5.2.
5.3.4.2 Computation Requirement
Once a request to play a card is received, several verification checks are performed. Algo-
rithm 7 details the steps required to verify a play card request as legitimate. If any of the
steps fail, a cheat is detected and the game is halted.
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Field Purpose
cuid Card ID: each card must be distin-
guished from another card by an ID
sn Sequence number: each duplicate card
a player owns has an increasing se-
quence number
pid Player ID: each player has a unique
identifier, which is attached to the card
on purchase
cinfo Card Information: Vital statistics about
the card such as artwork, rules, and de-
scription
p The index of the public number used
to generate this card during base deck
generation
SP layer(p) Player digital signature: the signature
by the player sent during the play deck
commitment for card p
ip The private number used to generate
this card during base deck generation
Table 5.2: Message Format for M+G Play Card Request: Fields in the play card message.
Algorithm 7: Steps Necessary to Verify an Opponent’s Play Card Request
1. Verify that the hash of (p, SP layer(p)) matches what was declared during the play
deck creation phase
2. Verify that the card has been dealt and has not been played before, by checking that
the hash of (p, SP layer(p)) exists in the list of dealt cards and has not been used
before
3. Verify that ip XOR jp mod |U |, where jp equals the pth public number created by
the player during the base deck creation phase, equals the index in |U | of the card
attempting to be played
4. Verify that pth signature sent by the opponent during the base deck creation phase
was generated using the private number ip being sent
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5.3.4.3 M+G Performance Improvements
As stated earlier, verification of cards takes place in real time. That being said, it does not
mean that the verification need block player action. As a performance improvement, player
moves could be accepted at face value when announced and verified in a background ex-
ecution thread while the game continues. In some styles of gameplay, this asynchronous
form of verification would require a go back N moves style mechanism to reconcile dis-
crepancies. In M+G, however, the only discrepancy that need be identified is cheating,
which halts the game. As a result, there is no need to design a sophisticated go back in time
system. If, at any point, a cheat is identified, the game will halt.
In order to optimize the size of messages sent during gameplay, static information, such
as a card’s rules, artwork, and other vital statistics could be exchanged once, up front, when
the player’s base deck is determined. Matches using play styles such as constructed deck,
as stated earlier, must know of the base deck of another player so that consistent ordering
can be maintained. This optimization would expand that requirement to affect all styles
of game play. The benefit to this, though, is that during the initial exchange players can
be made aware of any cards that are unknown to them. This would allow for sending just
the required information about a card to the other player during a play card request. An
updated play card message format is shown in Table 5.3.
5.3.5 M+G in Mobile Environments
As stated earlier, we chose the AndroidTM platform for our simulation because we intend for
this protocol capable of use in an ad-hoc P2P environments. Instead of the large overlays
previous work has relied on, we wanted to look beyond that to today’s disconnected but
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Field Purpose
cuid Card ID: each card must be distin-
guished from another card by an ID
sn Sequence number: each duplicate card
a player owns has an increasing se-
quence number
pid Player ID: each player has a unique
identifier, which is attached to the card
on purchase
p The index of the public number used
to generate this card during base deck
generation
SP layer(p) Player digital signature: the signature
by the player sent during the play deck
commitment for card p
ip The private number used to generate
this card during base deck generation
Table 5.3: Fields in an optimized play card message.
mobile environment. For instance, what if two people waiting at an airport or waiting for
a bus, decided they wanted to play a TCG with each other, but one (or both) of them does
not have a data connection?
In order for such a scenario to work, the clients must have all of the information and
data necessary to validate cards and play the game without being able to check in with a
central authority (CA). The design of M+G allows just that.
In the constructed deck play style, the information available to the player is the public
key of the CA, as well as the signed information about cards the player owns. There is no
need for a player to know about all cards in existence since the only cards that matter are
the ones being played. Any cards that an opponent might own, that the player does not,
will be made aware to them during the play stage of the game. The rule set associated with
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a card will be sent along with a CA signature, allowing for the player to verify that the CA
created this card and the rules are valid.
In the sealed deck, identical deck, and draft deck play styles, information about all
cards in the universe deck must be known, so the range of the random numbers generated
is correct. No validation of ownership is needed, however, since none of the players own
the cards being used in these styles. The only signature verification needed in this case is
to verify the card being played is a valid card in the game.
Validation Requirement M+G’s Solution
Card Existence Check the card’s CA signature against known CA key
Card Ownership Check the card’s CA’s signature of player ID / card ID /
sequence number against known CA key
Card Properties and Rules Check the card’s CA signature against known CA key
Table 5.4: Categorization of M+G Validation: A categorization of M+G’s offline validation
Table 5.4 shows each validation requirement needed for a client to work in a discon-
nected, ad-hoc P2P manner, and how M+G provides a mechanism for that verification.
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Chapter 6
HYPAR-TCG: A Hybrid P2P
Architecture for Trading Card Games
using Match+Guardian
In this chapter we outline a HYbrid P2P Architecture for Trading Card Games, HYPAR-
TCG. To implement and evaluate all aspects of an architecture of this complexity is well
beyond the scope of this work. Instead, we will outline the key required capabilities of the
system. The core component of HYPAR-TCG is Match+Guardian, a P2P based gameplay
protocol introduced in chapter 5. This allows for us to offload all of the computation and
messaging costs of running a game to the game clients themselves. We will be introducing
other P2P systems, in addition to M+G, necessary to build an entire TCG system. This
will let us increase the utilization of the P2P network, and increase the cost savings for
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the server. Specifically, we will be describing systems for: matchmaking, content caching,
player ranking, card purchasing, and card trading.
When designing a hybrid P2P architecture for supporting trading card games, there are
four main criteria by which we will measure success:
• Scalability: Can our architecture handle a high level of volume and churn in players?
• Responsiveness: Can our architecture perform well enough when users are playing
the game that perceived delay is within acceptable limits? Does it provide a means
to allow clients to connect to each other, regardless of the direct connectivity allowed
between them?
• Market Viability: Does our architecture have a mechanism to allow users to purchase
cards and prove to other players that they own those cards?
• Security: Does our architecture protect items bought by players from being dupli-
cated? Is there a secure means for players to trade cards with each other?
In this chapter we present a HYbrid P2P ARchitecture for TCGs (HYPAR-TCG) that
address all four of these criteria.
6.1 High Level Architecture
HYPAR-TCG’s core is a traditional, centralized server architecture used to support trusted
actions such as account management, billing, signing purchased items, and facilitating
trade between players. It also serves as the authoritative data store for card vital statis-
tics, player rankings, and other required information.
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Supporting the centralized core, however, are two separate P2P overlays built from
users currently active in the game. One of the overlays is a distributed implementation of
skip lists and is used to facilitate matchmaking amongst peers. The other is a Distributed
Hash Table and serves as a caching mechanism for public data recently accessed from the
central server. In this capacity, the DHT serves a role very similar to a Level 1 (primary)
cache in a modern Central Processing Unit (CPU). A diagram depicting this architecture is
shown in Figure 6.1.
Gameplay between peers, as described in Chapter 5.1, is handled via Match+Guardian
(M+G), a secure P2P based protocol for TCG gameplay. Details about M+G are shown in
Chapter 5.
Figure 6.1: High Level Architecture: This diagram shows a high level picture of how HYPAR-TCG
is organized.
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6.2 Central Server Design
In an ideal design, one would have a purely distributed game framework without the need
for a central server. This would eliminate all hardware and network costs and would allow
game designers to focus on producing content only. Unfortunately, government regulations
concerning the protection of private data, not to mention the reaction of credit card com-
panies to the idea that user’s account numbers would be stored on uncontrolled machines,
prevent this from being a reality. Thus, HYPAR-TCG contains a centralized server in its
design.
The job of the central server in HYPAR-TCG involves any player action that requires
global connectivity or trusted authority. Table 6.1 breaks down the individual responsibili-
ties of the server.
6.2.1 Central Server as a Signature, Purchasing, and Trade Authority
When a user purchases a card, it contacts the central server to do. At that time, the server
creates a record of the sale and provides a signed player ID / card ID / sequence number
tuple to the client. The client can use this signed tuple when playing the TCG to prove to
other clients that they legitimately own the card. Details involving the verification method
of the server generated signature are outlined in Chapter 5.
However, what if the player wishes to trade his card with another player? The central
server facilitates this kind of interaction as well. When two players wish to trade a card
with each other, they contact the central server. The recipient player in the trade is issued a
signed tuple similar to the one issued when purchasing a card. The player releasing control
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Responsibility Description
Signature and Purchasing Authority The server will act as a trusted signa-
ture and purchasing authority to allow
players to purchase and verify owner-
ship of new cards
Trade Broker The server will act as a trusted trade
broker between players
Master Data Repository The server will house master copies of
player and card data for retrieval and
insertion into DHT cache (discussed
further in Chapter 6.4)
Player Ratings Calculator The server will validate and analyse the
outcomes of player matches and update
player ratings as appropriate
Communications Broker The server will serve as a trusted broker
for network communication between
peers, if direct communication between
them is not possible
Table 6.1: Roles of the Central Server in HYPAR-TCG: A list of the responsibilities of the central
server.
of the card receives an updated and signed revocation list, a list of server signatures for this
player that are no longer valid, from the server. In this capacity, the signature revocation list
acts much the same way as a certificate revocation list does in public key infrastructures,
and prevents the client from using the now released card in future games.
It is important to note, however, that although the player that traded the card away now
has a revocation for it, that does not prevent them from acquiring another copy of the card in
the future. The revocation information includes both the card ID and the sequence number
of the card being revoked. If the player later purchases another copy of the card, it will be
issued with a higher sequence number and will not be affected by the revocation.
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6.2.1.1 Revocation List Enforcement
During gameplay, players must present a signed version of the revocation list to their oppo-
nent so that cards can be verified during play. However, what forces the player to present
the most recent version of this revocation list? Could the player just present the list origi-
nally given to them when they created their account, which contains no cards?
In order to prevent this, we propose the following modifications to the digital trading
card and revocation list:
• Add a latest deck version (LDV) property to the revocation list. Each time a player
purchases or trades a card, a new revocation list is generated with its LDV counter
increased by one.
• Add a deck version (DV) value to each new card granted to the player equal to the
incremented latest deck version value of the revocation list.
• Add an expiration date to the revocation list so that opponents can verify that a player
is using a recent copy of the list.
A list of the fields in a player’s revocation list is shown in Table 6.2. The required fields
of a digital trading card needed for validation are shown in Table 6.3.
As an example, consider the trade between player depicted in Figure 6.2. Before the
trade, player A owned card 12 sequence number 1, purchased at deck version 3. The player
also has a latest deck version of 3. When trading the card, the server issues a new revocation
list to player A stating that card 12 sequence number 1, purchased at deck version 3 has been
revoked, and increases the latest deck version of the revocation list to 4. Player B receives
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Field Purpose
revoked Revoked Card List: The card ID, se-
quence number, and deck version of
each card that has been revoked by the
server
LDV Latest Deck Version: The latest deck
version number issued by the server
expiration Expiration Date: The date at which this
revocation list is no longer considered
current
Table 6.2: List of Fields in the Revocation List: The list of fields present in a server issued revoca-
tion list for a player
Field Purpose
cid Card ID: The card ID of the card being
played
seqnum Sequence Number: The sequence num-
ber of this card. This allows for dupli-
cate cards owned by the player to be
distinguished.
dv Deck Version: The latest deck version
of the player’s revocation list after the
card was originally issued. This value
does not have to match the current lat-
est deck version for the player, but does
have to be less than or equal to it.
Table 6.3: List of Validation Fields in a Digital Trading Card: The list of fields needed to validate
a player’s revocation list against a digital trading card during gameplay
98
a new signed message from the server stating that it now owns card 12 sequence number 1
at deck version 2, the new latest deck version for player B..
Figure 6.2: Trading Example: This diagram shows an example of two nodes trading a card with
each other via the central server.
With these additions in place for both the trading card and the revocation list, it is now
possible to perform comprehensive validation of the ownership of cards a player reveals
during play. Verification of revocation lists will take place both at the protocol level during
gameplay, and on the server during ratings calculation. Algorithm 8 describes the different
validation steps that will take place throughout the system.
6.2.1.2 Server LAM Validation
During LAM validation the server’s goal is to prevent clients from being able to take credit
for matches won using older versions of their decks, even though they have traded and
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Algorithm 8: Steps Necessary to Verify the Revocation List of a Player
1. Before gameplay begins, players exchange revocation lists and sign a list assertion
message (LAM) to each other verifying the latest deck version of the list presented
to them. If the expiration of the revocation list presented to the player is out of date,
a warning will be issued to the player stating that, if they proceed with the match, it
might not be rated by the server and the win/loss record might not be recorded.
2. During gameplay, in addition to other validation steps described in Chapter 5.2.7,
the opponent checks to make sure that the deck version of the card being played is
not larger than the latest deck version of the revocation list presented to them during
LAM creation, and that the card is not on the revocation list.
3. After gameplay is complete, in addition to the list of signed moves that took place
during the game, the LAM message is sent to the server. This allows for clients to be
able to prove the LDV value of the other player, even if that player refuses to upload
their match results. The server then checks the periods of time during which both
player’s LDV values were active, and makes a determination if the match is valid and
should be rated.
purchased cards since then. It is not the intention of this validation to prevent clients from
working in a disconnected state for long periods of time, however. If a player wishes to
travel to Antarctica and play TCGs for 3 months in a disconnected state, that is fine, as long
as the player does not purchase or trade cards while they are using the disconnected client.
The manner in which this validation is enforced by the server involves inspecting the
periods of time in which each player’s latest deck value, as reported by the clients in their
LAM messages, was valid. If, at any point in time, all LDV values reported were the
active LDV values for each player, the match hypothetically could have taken place and is
therefore considered legitimate by the server. If, however, any of the reported LDV values
could not have been active during the timeframe in which other player’s LDV values were
active, one or more of the clients were using an out of date deck in the match. This causes
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the server to reject the match. The win/loss record, as well as all signed moves reported,
will be thrown out.
6.2.2 Player Rankings Calculations
A core component to any competitive game is the ability to impartially rank players ac-
cording to their performance. HYPAR-TCG will use the World Chess Federation’s (FIDE)
implementation of the Elo rating system [Elo78] for determining player rankings. The
specifics of the system will not be described in detail here, but at a high level, an Elo rating
is a single number value that represents the skill of a player, and is computed by analyzing
the performance of the player over all of their previous matches. At the end of a match, the
amount of points that one player gains and another player loses are determined by the Elo
rating of the players involved.
Since the central server is not directly involved in gameplay, it is not able to automati-
cally know the outcome of matches. To solve this problem, we require that clients upload
the results of the match to the server so that they can be given credit for the outcome. This
mechanism immediately opens the door to cheating, however. What if two players don’t
agree on the outcome of the match?
Since we are using M+G as the game protocol to play the TCG, cheating by a player
when reporting wins and losses can be prevented by submitting the signed moves generated
by each player during gameplay. Since the cheating player will be unable to fake the sig-
nature of their opponent, they will be unable to successfully create a sequence of messages
indicating they won when they did not. As an added bonus, by submitting the sequence
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of signed messages, the server could allow players to replay matches by downloading and
stepping through the messages for themselves.
6.2.3 Central Server as Network Proxy
As stated in Chapter 2.3.4, when communicating in a P2P environment there are several
workarounds that allow a majority of peers are able to directly communicate with each
other regardless of the network topology between them. In the cases that remain, however,
a network proxy is needed that is visible to both peers in order to facilitate communication.
In HYPAR-TCG, the central server provides that capability. A high-level picture of how
the network proxy will work is presented in Figure 6.3.
In the case that two peers cannot connect with each other, they both contact the central
server to ask for a network proxy node to connect with. These proxy nodes need not be
very complicated. The computational demand on them will be negligible, since all of the
gameplay mechanics are handled on the clients. All that is required of the proxy is to
forward packets from one peer to the other. In terms of security to the clients, there is no
chance of a man-in-the-middle style attack on the peers. The proxy node is controlled by
the central server, and is therefore considered safe.
6.3 Matchmaking P2P Overlay Design
Another key capability for a TCG architecture is the ability for players to find opponents
of similar skill that are wanting to play the same style of game. In order to provide this
matchmaking capability to the user without incurring network and computation cost to the
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Figure 6.3: Proxy Node Example: This diagram shows an example of two nodes, unable to commu-
nicate with each other directly due to network limitations, using a proxy node provided
by the central server as a workaround.
central server, we propose joining clients together into a SkipNet [HJS+03] distributed
overlay.
At a high level, Skipnet is based on the concept of skip-lists, an efficient mechanism
for excluding items quickly from searches through ordering nodes by content and then
providing pointers to skip over sections of the data. This idea was first introduced by
Pugh [Pug90]. As a data structure, a skip list is a sorted linked list in which some nodes
have supplemental pointers that “skip” over many elements. The number of nodes that
are skipped depends on the entry’s height in the list. Height is calculated such that the
“height of the ith node is the exponent of the largest power of two that divides i” [HJS+03].
Pointers for nodes at height h skip 2h nodes, thus allowing for a search time of O(logN).
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SkipNet organizes nodes by ordering them based on the longest common prefix of
their name into a ring routing infrastructure. In HYPAR-TCG’s matchmaking overlay,
we propose that nodes are named based on a convention that will group nodes of similar
skills and gameplay styles together. This is an ideal solution for a matchmaking system,
as the kinds of searches that will be performed in the overlay could then be simplified to
looking at adjacent peers in the ring. For instance, if a player named Bob of Master skill
looking to play a Constructed deck style match enters the game, they would be added to the
matchmaking overlay as Master/Constructed/Bob. Once added, Bob could check nodes to
the left and right of him in the SkipNet ring to find candidate opponents. A example of this
discovery mechanism is shown in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Matchmaking DHT Example: This diagram shows an example of how a client would
identify candidate players in their level of expertise, looking to play the same style of
game, in a SkipNet overlay.
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6.4 Caching DHT Design
In order to reduce the network load to the central server from clients retrieving information
about the game in HYPAR-TCG, we propose creating a P2P based data cache by joining
together clients into a Chord [SMK+01] overlay.
Chord is a system based on the concept of Distributed Hash Tables (DHT)s. DHTs, at a
high level, are a class of distributed systems that allow for data lookup using a mechanism
similar to a traditional hash table. The advantages to this design is that data is uniformly
distributed between peers, allowing for load balancing of data. The average length of a
query in Chord is O(logN).
When requesting card or player data from HYPAR-TCG, the client first checks to see
if a cached version of the data is available in the Chord overlay. If the data is not available,
the client requests a copy of the data from the central server and then inserts that copy into
the cache so that subsequent requests do not have to involve the server. An example of this
flow is shown in Figure 6.5.
6.4.1 Temporal Locality in the Cache
While some data, such as card artwork, may never change, data such as player rankings do
change over time. Although the server copy of this data will be accurate and will reflect
all changes to date, the version in the cache can get out of sync. In order to prevent costly
pushes of changes into the cache each time data is updated, we propose a system by which
cache data expires over time. When a node in Chord receives a request to retrieve a given
set of information, it will first check the expiration date for that file. If the information is
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Figure 6.5: Caching DHT Example: This diagram shows an example flow of a client attempting to
find a file in the Chord overlay cache and then, when failing to do so, requesting the file
from the central server and inserting it into the DHT.
out of date, it will be removed and a not found response will be sent to the requesting node.
The central server will then be contacted, similar to the flow for data not in the cache, and
then a new copy will be inserted back into Chord.
6.4.2 Spatial Locality in the Cache
In order to prevent multiple requests to the server for related data about a topic, we propose
pre-fetching that data and sending it along with the requested information to the client. For
instance, suppose a player is requesting to see information about the last match for a friend.
The server can, in addition to sending the match information, also send vital statics about
the friend to the client. This information will then be inserted into the cache. If the player
106
then decides to look at the data, it will not have to contact the server again and can instead
go directly to the P2P cache for the information.
As a potential improvement, the server could consider including observed player be-
havior when determining which data is related to a piece of requested information. For
instance, consider a scenario where a player, requesting to see information about player
A’s last match, also requests to see information about the other players in that match 85%
of the time. In that case, the server could send information to the client about the other
players involved in a match, each time details about a match for a player are requested.
6.5 Centralized vs. HYPAR-TCG System Performance
In order to better understand the motivation for wanting to create a hybrid P2P based sys-
tem, it is important to quantify the potential server-side savings of the architecture. In order
to do this, we need to break down the number of messages and server-side operations per-
formed in both a fully centralized and HYPAR-TCG system. Once that is done, we can
compare how those numbers grow as client populations grow. The specific operations that
we will be characterizing for our comparison are:
• Purchasing a card
• Trading a card
• Generating cards for players to use in tournament style play
• Shuffling cards for players to use during gameplay
• Broadcasting card draw/play messages and maintaining game state during a match
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• Ranking players after a match
When categorizing actions on the server necessary to service client operations, we will
be organizing them into three groups: database operations, signature operations, and other
operations. When computing the total cost of an action, it is important to account for the
relative cost of different kinds of server-side operations. Database operations, for instance,
can be I/O intensive. Signature operations, while purely CPU bound, involve many com-
plex math operations and can be equally intensive. By separating messages into these three
groups, we can vary the relative cost of each group and allow for us to determine what
overhead is tolerable for each kind of operation.
When describing the messages necessary to coordinate actions between the client and
the server, we will categorize them into two distinct groups: signed messages and unsigned
messages. All of the messages in both the client/server architecture and the centralized
server architecture send the same kinds of information back and forth, such as card IDs and
status information. With signed messages, however, a fixed overhead equal to the length of
the signature associated with the message is added. Because of this, we want to distinguish
signed vs. unsigned messages so that we can vary the overhead percentage associated with
the server signature. This will allow us to determine what strength of signatures the system
can support without taxing the system too greatly.
In both HYPAR-TCG, and a normal CSA, clients can connect via Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) to the central server. This prevents both the client and the server from having to sign
or encrypt messages. In HYPAR-TCG, however, clients need to be able to verify ownership
of cards with each other during gameplay, without the assistance of the central server. This
requires the additional server-side step of signing ownership messages for each card traded
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or purchased. Thus, signed messages are only created and sent during specific steps in
HYPAR-TCG, and not at all in a normal CSA.
It is not the claim of this work that a P2P architecture will out-perform a centralized
server architecture (CSA) in all types of operations. There are certain kinds of functions
(such as trading) that are inherently easier when the central server is solely responsible
for enforcing different aspects of gameplay. What we will show, however, is that in the
areas that a hybrid P2P architecture is able to improve server-side performance, those gains
outweigh the increased complexity in other operations.
There is also an increase to client-side responsibilities as part of the hybrid-P2P archi-
tecture. As is shown in Chapter 5.3, however, the client is capable of handling this extra
responsibility without introducing perceived delay greater than real-life observed behavior.
6.5.1 Purchasing a card
One of the most basic operations a trading card system would have to support is the pur-
chasing of cards to include in a player’s deck. Without this capability, clients would have
no way in which to acquire cards with which to play with.
6.5.1.1 CSA
In a centralized server architecture (CSA), a client simply sends one message to the server
requesting to purchase a card. The server would then update its database to indicate own-
ership of the card by the player, and a response would be sent back to the client stating that
the purchase was successful. An algorithm describing this process is shown in Algorithm 9.
109
Algorithm 9: CSA Operations and Messages Required When Purchasing a Card
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to server requesting purchase
2. Database Operation: Server updates database to indicate ownership of card
3. Unsigned Message: Server responds to client stating purchase was successful
Based on this description, a card purchase involves two unsigned messages and one
database operation on the server. Assuming that X players are active in the game, and that
each player purchases C cards per hour, unsigned server messages grow according to the
formula 2XC and server database operations grow by XC per hour.
6.5.1.2 HYPAR-TCG
In HYPAR-TCG, card purchasing requires more steps because of the signatures and revo-
cation list updates involved. A detailed description of these steps is shown in algorithm 10.
In this scenario two unsigned messages, two signed messages, two signature operations,
and two database operations are necessary to complete a card purchase. Assuming that X
players are active in the game, and that each player purchases C cards per hour, server
unsigned messages grow according to the formula 2XC, server signed messages grow by
2XC, server signature operations grow by 2XC, and server database operations grow by
2XC per hour.
6.5.2 Trading a Card
Equally as important as the ability to purchase a card in a TCG is the ability to trade
that card with another player. For the person receiving the card being traded, the required
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Algorithm 10: HYPAR-TCG Operations and Messages Required When Purchasing a Card
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to server requesting purchase
2. Database Operation: Server updates database to indicate ownership of card
3. Signature Operation: Server creates signed ownership message indicating player
owns the card
4. Database Operation: Server updates revocation list LDV for player
5. Signature Operation: Server signs revocation list for player
6. Unsigned Message: Server responds to client stating purchase was successful
7. Signed Message: Server sends signed ownership message to client
8. Signed Message: Server sends signed and updated revocation list to client
actions by the server are very similar to those needed during a card purchase. For the person
giving the card away, however, additional actions are required.
6.5.2.1 CSA
In a CSA if two players, A and B, are trading a card, there are two different sets of actions
that are performed. Both A’s and B’s inventory must be updated. First, A sends a request
to the server to indicate that it is entering a trade transaction with B. Once A agrees to
the trade, the server removes it from A’s inventory and issues the card to B. The steps
involved in issuing a card to B are very similar to purchasing a card. The update for player
A is described in Algorithm 11. An algorithm describing the trade for player B is shown
in Algorithm 12.
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Algorithm 11: CSA Operations and Messages Required for Player A During a Trade
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to server initiating trade with player B
2. Database Operation: Server updates database to remove ownership of card
3. Unsigned Message: Server responds to client stating trade was successful
Algorithm 12: CSA Operations and Messages Required for Player B During a Trade
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to initiate trade with player A
2. Database Operation: Server updates database to indicate ownership of card
3. Unsigned Message: Server responds to client stating trade was successful
In this case four unsigned messages and two server database operations were required
to process the trade. Assuming X players active in the game and D trades are performed in
an hour, unsigned server messages grow according to the formula 4XD and server database
operations grow by 2XD per hour.
6.5.2.2 HYPAR-TCG
Similar to a CSA, if players A and B are trading a card, there are two different sets of
actions that are performed to update both player’s inventories. The update for player A is
described in Algorithm 13. An algorithm describing the trade for player B is shown in
Algorithm 14.
In this case four unsigned messages, three signed messages, four database operations,
and three signature operations were required by the server in HYPAR-TCG to facilitate
the trade between players A and B. If X players were active in the game and performed
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Algorithm 13: HYPAR-TCG Operations and Messages Required for Player A During a
Trade
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to server initiating trade with player B
2. Database Operation: Server updates database to remove ownership of card
3. Database Operation: Server updates revocation list, incrementing LDV and revoking
traded card
4. Signature Operation: Server signs updated revocation list
5. Unsigned Message: Server responds to client stating trade was successful
6. Signed Message: Server sends updated revocation list to client
Algorithm 14: HYPAR-TCG Operations and Messages Required for Player B During a
Trade
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to initiate trade with player A
2. Database Operation: Server updates database to indicate ownership of card
3. Signature Operation: Server creates signed ownership message indicating player
owns the card
4. Database Operation: Server updates revocation list LDV for player
5. Signature Operation: Server signs revocation list for player
6. Unsigned Message: Server responds to client stating trade was successful
7. Signed Message: Server sends signed ownership message to client
8. Signed Message: Server sends signed and updated revocation list to client
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D trades per hour, signed server messages grow according to the formula 3XD, unsigned
server messages grow by 4XD, server database operations grow by 4XD, and server sig-
nature operations grow by 3XD.
6.5.3 Generating Cards
During both Sealed Deck and Identical Deck game types, a critical part of the match is
the generation of random cards for the players to use. In HYPAR-TCG the cost of this
random generation is solely the responsibility of the clients, since the cards are generated
using a P2P protocol. In a CSA, however, the cards must be generated randomly by the
server. In the worst case, Sealed Deck play, a unique deck must be generated for each
player participating in the game. Algorithm 15 describes the steps required for each client
to request a random deck from the server.
Algorithm 15: CSA Operations and Messages Required to Generate a Deck of Cards
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to server requesting a random base deck
2. Other Operation: For each card generated, the server computes a random number
3. Unsigned Message: Server sends random deck to the client
Two unsigned messages, and other operations equal to the number of cards being gen-
erated, are required by the server for each player when generating a random base deck each
match. Assume that there are X active players in the game and that matches contain, on
average M players. Furthermore, assume that P percent of games are participating in a
gameplay style requiring generated decks, and the base deck of each player consists of B
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cards. In that case, if players participate in N matches per hour, unsigned server messages
grow by 2PNX/M , and server other operations grow by PBNX/M .
6.5.4 Shuffling Cards
Before starting a match, players shuffle the cards in their play deck to ensure fairness in the
card drawing process. In HYPAR-TCG, shuffling is handled in a P2P manner and does not
incur a server side cost. However, in a CSA, shuffling must be performed on the server.
Algorithm 16 describes the process of shuffling a player’s play deck.
Algorithm 16: CSA Operations and Messages Required to Shuffle a Play Deck
1. Unsigned Message: Client indicates to server the play deck it will be using for the
match
2. Other Operation: The server shuffles the play deck
3. Unsigned Message: Server sends notification that the deck has been shuffled to the
client
Shuffling a deck with B cards has been shown to be possible in O(B) steps [Dur64].
Assume that N matches take place per hour, containing, on average, M players. In that
case, 2NM unsigned messages and NMB server other operations are required to shuffle a
deck.
6.5.5 Maintaining Game State and Broadcasting Messages
During a match, each player must be made aware of the actions of each other player. De-
pending on the rules of the game, any player action could be interrupted, which means
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that all clients must have a chance to respond to each player choice. In HYPAR-TCG,
player draw and play messages are handled entirely via P2P communication, alleviating
the responsibility of the server to broker the messages. In a CSA, however, the server must
redeliver each message sent to it during gameplay by any client to each other client in play.
The server must also update the server-side state of the game to represent the cards that
have been played. Algorithm 17 describes the scenario of a client drawing a card, and
Algorithm 18 details the steps required during the playing of a card.
Algorithm 17: CSA Operations and Messages Required For a Client to Draw a Card
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to server requesting to draw a card
2. Other Operation: Server removes a card from the player’s play deck
3. Unsigned Message: Server sends the drawn card to the client
4. Unsigned Message: For each other player in the game, a message is sent stating that
the player drew a card
Algorithm 18: CSA Operations and Messages Required For a Client to Play a Card
1. Unsigned Message: Client sends message to server requesting to play a card
2. Other Operation: Server updates state to indicate the card has been played
3. Unsigned Message: For each other player in the game, a message is sent stating that
the player played a card
For a player to draw a card, one server side other operation and two unsigned messages
are required. In addition, an unsigned message to each client participating in the game must
be sent. For a player to play a card, one unsigned message is required, plus one server side
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other operation. In addition, one message to each client participating in the game must be
sent indicating the card has been played. Assume that X active players are playing, and
on average M players participate in a game. Furthermore, assume that E cards are played
each match by every player, and F cards are drawn each match by every player. If players
participate in N matches per hour, server unsigned messages for a CSA grow according to
the formula NX(2F + FM + E + EM)/M . Server other operations grow by NXF/M .
6.5.6 Ranking players
After a match is complete, the server must update the rankings of all players that partici-
pated in the match. This is done to reflect the new win and loss records for each involved
player.
6.5.6.1 CSA
In a CSA, the win/loss record of the match is already known to the server, since game state
was being maintained during the match. All that is required is for the server to perform the
rankings calculation, and then to update the ranking record for each player. An algorithm
describing this process is shown in Algorithm 19.
Algorithm 19: CSA Operations and Messages Required For Ranking a Match
1. Other Operation: Server identifies that the match is complete
2. Database Operation: The win/loss rating is updated for each participating player
One server other operation, plus database operations equal to the number of participat-
ing players, is required. Assume that X players are active in the game, and that each player
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participates in N matches containing M players. In that case, the formula for describing
the number of server other actions required would be XN . Server database actions would
grow according to XMN .
6.5.6.2 HYPAR-TCG
In HYPAR-TCG, the client machines must send the signed outcome of the match to the
server, so that it can be validated. The server then will update the win/loss record of each
player. Algorithm 20 describes the ranking process.
Algorithm 20: HYPAR-TCG Operations and Messages Required For Ranking a Match
1. Signed Message: Each client in the match sends a message to the server stating that
the match is complete and who the winner was
2. Signature Operation: The server validates the signature of each incoming message
3. Other Operation: The server validates the Latest Deck Value (LDV) for each player
4. Database Operation: The win/loss rating is updated for each participating player
Recall that validation of all of the moves contained within a reported match will only
occur if one or more players refuses to sign the outcome of the match. Therefore, there is
not an explicit cost associated with that activity described in Algorithm 20.
Server other, signature, and database operations, equal to the number of participating
players, is required. In addition, a signed message for each player is sent to the server. As-
sume that X players are active in the game, and that each player participates in N matches
containing M players. In that case, the formula for describing the number of server other,
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CSA HYPAR-TCG
Server Action Unsigned Unsigned Signed
Purchase a Card 2XC 2XC 2XC
Trade a Card 4XD 4XD 3XD
Generate Cards 2PNX/M 0 0
Shuffle Cards 2NM 0 0
Broadcast Actions NX(2F + FM + E + EM)/M 0 0
Ranking Actions 0 0 XMN
Table 6.4: Summary of Server Message Growth: A summary of the cost of signed and unsigned
messages for different server operations between a CSA architecture and HYPAR-TCG
database, and signature actions required would be XMN . In addition, server signed mes-
sages grow by XMN .
6.5.7 Performance Comparison
In order to create a unified model for server-side messaging and action costs, it is necessary
to identify all the terms and formulas from each server operation. Table 6.4 lists the associ-
ated formulas for each of the server message types. Table 6.5 lists the formulas for each of
the server action types. Table 6.6 lists descriptions and values used in the comparison for
each unique term contained in the formulas.
With the formulas identified for each of the actions that we will be profiling between
a CSA architecture and HYPAR-TCG, we can now introduce combined formulas for mes-
saging and server-side operations. Table 6.7 lists those formulas.
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 compare the costs of actions and messages between a CSA and
HYPAR-TCG, as user population grows. In HYPAR-TCG actions, there is an increased
number of database accesses, along with higher costs associated with signature operations.
However, the frequency of operations that require signatures and database operations in
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CSA HYPAR-TCG
Server Action DB Other DB Sign Other
Purchase a Card XC 0 2XC 2XC 0
Trade a Card 2XD 0 4XD 3XD 0
Generate Cards 0 PBNX/M 0 0 0
Shuffle Cards 0 NMB 0 0 0
Broadcast Messages 0 NXF/M 0 0 0
Ranking Actions XMN XN XMN XMN XMN
Table 6.5: Summary of Server Operations Growth: A summary of the cost of database, signature,
and other operations for different server operations between a CSA architecture and
HYPAR-TCG
HYPAR-TCG is not very large. This allows for the relatively high cost of operations to be
offset. In terms of messaging, a CSA must be responsible for all aspects of gameplay. This
puts a much higher burden on the server, as compared to HYPAR-TCG. Given the values
shown in Table 6.6, the number of messages in HYPAR-TCG is reduced by over an order
of magnitude, compared to a CSA. In addition, the number of server actions is reduced by
50%.
In order to see at what point HYPAR-TCG stops being effective at reducing server-side
action costs, we identified the number of purchases and trades that results in the action
performance graph reversing in favor of a CSA. Figure 6.8 demonstrates this scenario. In
order for a CSA to perform less server-side actions than HYPAR-TCG, each player must
purchase at least ≈ 53 cards and trade at least 15 cards each day. This would mean that, in
one month, every player would own approximately 1590 cards. In Magic the Gathering TM,
a popular TCG, there are 10840 unique cards in existence [otC]. At the rate of ≈ 53
purchases a day, every player would own every card in seven months. Given that, it does
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Term Description Value Value Justification
X Number of active players Varies This will be the variable term used when
plotting the graph
C Number of card purchases
per hour
0.625 15 cards are allocated to a Magic the
GatheringTM booster pack, a common
method of acquiring new cards. Assume a
purchase rate of one booster pack per day
D Number of trades per-
formed in an hour
0.125 Trades between players can be performed
on individual cards. Assume that three
trades occur between players each day
P Percentage of active
games requiring generated
decks
.25 Based on equal distribution of gameplay
styles listed in Chapter 5.1.2
N Number of matches play-
ers participate in per hour
2 Maximum number of games possible
based on observed session length for two
players as shown in Chapter 5.3.1.
M Average number of players
in a match
2 Most matches are one-on-one style play
E Number of cards played by
a player during a match
20 Equal to half the Magic The
Gathering’sTM tournament deck min-
imum play deck size of 40
F Number of cards drawn by
a player during a match
30 Equal to 75% of Magic The
Gathering’sTM tournament deck min-
imum play deck size of 40
B Number of cards in a
player’s deck
40 Based on Magic The Gathering’sTM tour-
nament deck minimum size
S Scale factor for relative
cost of signature opera-
tions
3 Assume that signatures cost three times as
much as other operations
T Scale factor for relative
cost of database opera-
tions
5 Assume that database operations cost five
times as much as other operations
U Scale factor for signature
overhead of signed mes-
sages
2 Assume that signing messages doubles
the message size as compared to unsigned
messages
Table 6.6: Terms Used in Architecture Comparison: A description of each term and value
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Model Name Formula
CSA Message Model 2XC + 4XD + 2PNX/M + 2NM + NX(2F +
FM + E + EM)/M
CSA Action Model T (XC + 2XD +XMN) + PBNX/M +NMB +
NXF/M +XN
HYPAR-TCG Message Model S(2XC + 3XD +XMN) + 2XC + 4XD
HYPAR-TCG Action Model T (2XC + 4XD + XMN) + U(2XC + 3XD +
XMN) +XMN
Table 6.7: Action and Message Models for a CSA and HYPAR-TCG: A listing of the message and































Figure 6.6: Comparison of a CSA and HYPAR-TCG Messaging Costs: This graph shows a com-




























Figure 6.7: Comparison of a CSA and HYPAR-TCG Action Costs: This graph shows a comparison
of the action costs of both a Centralized Server Architecture and HYPAR-TCG
not seem likely that a TCG would experience that level of purchasing and trading, and that
the advantage of HYPAR-TCG over a CSA would hold in real life.
6.6 Effectiveness of HYPAR-TCG as a TCG Architecture
With the design of HYPAR-TCG complete, we can now assess how each of the four success
criteria described above are satisfied with this architecture.
• Scalability: In terms of scalability, HYPAR-TCG is designed to offload server-side
computation and messaging costs through both the use of M+G as the core gameplay
protocol, and by redirecting duplicate network requests to the caching Distributed
Hash Table (DHT). The caching DHT allows for transferring the responsibility of
serving popular content to the clients, which reduces the load and network require-




























Figure 6.8: Meeting Point of CSA and HYPAR-TCG Action Costs: This graph shows the point at
which the number of purchases and trades in HYPAR-TCG causes the performance of
the system to be equal to that of a CSA. Increasing the number of purchases and trades
per day would allow a CSA to outperform HYPAR-TCG
updated as actual usage is identified to create an optimal caching mechanism for data.
Furthermore, by creating a system for matchmaking that is entirely handled within a
P2P overlay network, we can offload the network cost of that activity entirely from
the central server.
• Responsiveness: Between existing Network Address Translation (NAT) workarounds
and the HYPAR-TCG trusted network proxy, the architecture is able to facilitate P2P
interaction between any of its players. By using M+G as the gameplay protocol
during matches, perceived user experience is shown to be within acceptable limits.
• Market Viability: Through the use of a central billing authority and trusted signa-
tures, HYPAR-TCG is capable of providing an environment where users can pur-
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chase items and know that their purchase is safe. It provides safeguards both in terms
of their private information and in terms of their ability to prove ownership.
• Security: By providing a trusted trade system for players to exchange cards, main-
taining revocation lists for card ownership, and preventing multiple trades of the same
card within a period of time, HYPAR-TCG is designed to protect player investments




Measuring and modeling player movements and interactions in a virtual world are essential
to research in architectures for Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMO-
RPG) and other forms of online gameplay. It is our belief that the amount of work in
this area is inadequate, and that a great opportunity exists to expand our understanding of
virtual behavior inside these games. With this increased understanding will come a more
realistic set of models that researchers can use to validate future designs. The models we
provided as part of our work represent a first step towards this increased understanding, and
significantly improve our understanding of player behavior inside an MMORPG.
In addition, we have demonstrated how, using a set of common Peer-to-Peer protocols,
one can support TCGs with different play styles while ensuring cheat-proof play. This
common framework for Peer-to-Peer based card games enables the community to develop
new styles of play, without having to resolve the common problems facing games of this
genre. In order to measure the ability of our Peer-to-Peer protocol for actually playing a
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P2P TCG, we implemented M+G in Java using the AndroidTM development environment
and emulated a low-end smart phone. For a benchmark, we measured players playing a real
TCG and categorized their actions into playing cards and drawing cards. We then compared
the timings measured from our simulation with the observed timings and found that indeed
M+G worked well even in a constrained mobile environment.
Finally, we have shown how it was possible to architect a system designed from the
ground up to support P2P based TCG gameplay, while still providing centralized gover-
nance of authentication and privileged data management. Using multiple P2P overlays for
different aspects of server management we propose a system in which players will be able
to offload computational and network requirements of the system onto the clients them-
selves.
7.1 Contribution of the Research
Our research has furthered the understanding of player behavior inside MMORPGs. We
provided the first set of behavior models for players inside the game through detailed anal-
ysis of observations taken in two popular MMOs.
In addition, we have provided the first P2P based architecture optimized for playing
TCGs in mobile and disconnected situations. This allows for new environments, such as
ad-hoc P2P networks, for implementing games in this genre. Existing work in this area was
very limited, and with the introduction of M+G, researchers can begin to create systems in
this area.
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Finally, We have outlined the first comprehensive architecture for hosting TCGs that
uses a hybrid P2P approach. This changes the investment required by game manufacturers
in terms of hardware and bandwidth, and allows for offloading CPU and network intensive
tasks onto the client.
7.2 Implications of the Research
By gaining a better understanding of behavior inside MMORPGs, researchers can now
design simulations and create architectures knowing that the movement and player distri-
bution models they are using to prove their concepts are sound.
M+G and HYPAR-TCG represent a robust P2P environment for hosting many kinds of
TCGs. The implications of this contribution are that researchers and game designers can
now begin to implement this approach and free the user to play their games whenever and
wherever they would like, regardless of their Internet connectivity.
7.2.1 Implications for Future Research
In the area of MMORPG modeling, there are still several areas of player behavior we don’t
have insight into. Some of the areas include:
• Player to Player interactions (both with non player characters and player characters)
• Intra-zone movement of a player
• Micro-transaction modeling for player purchasing and trading
• Player interactions with objects inside the world
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In addition, M+G, although designed for TCGs, has implications far beyond that genre.
We believe there is a connection between generating sealed decks for online TCGs and
automatically generating the monsters, treasures, and maps for a game level. One could
apply these ideas for fairly generating game content between players, especially if those
levels are of a competitive nature. The basic principles introduced, such as secure random
number generation, content selection, and real-time verification, are concepts that can be
applied to many types of gameplay, and there exists a great opportunity to build on this
work.
Finally, as future work for HYPAR-TCG, there are several interesting problems, still
outstanding, that can help reduce load to the central server. Some of those problems in-
clude:
• Determining what cache timeout values optimize the usefulness of the P2P, Chord
based cache
• Improving the trading system so that peer trading would be possible
• Investigating if reputation management can be handled securely between peers and
then reported to the server, instead of having the server do the calculation
A simulation of HYPAR-TCG would allows us to further refine the computation and
messaging scenarios for the architecture. It would also allow us to more accurately refine
our centralized to P2P performance comparison model.
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7.3 Limitations of Study
We were unable to get server-side logs for the MMORPGs we observed, which forced us to
take probing based measurements of players using scripting interfaces made available by
the game. With access to logs, it would be possible to verify our findings and expand them
to include patterns of behavior that cannot be categorized given the data made publicly
available, such as player interactions with objects and other players inside a zone.
In addition, our dataset for observed real-life reaction times in TCGs is limited. Al-
though it was sufficient to give some initial understanding of how our protocol compared
to expected behavior, our case could be improved with additional data.
7.4 Final Conclusion
We have provided the first set of models of player behavior inside MMORPGs, created the
first P2P based protocol for cheat-proof gameplay of TCGs in mobile and disconnected
environments, and outlined a comprehensive architecture for hosting TCGs that utilizes a
hybrid P2P based infrastructure.
Our work in all cases has helped address gaps in understanding in the area of P2P based
MOGs, and has progressed the field of Computer Science. It is our hope that this work will
be found useful, and will be built upon.
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Appendix A
MMO Observation Data XSD
<?xml v e r s i o n = ” 1 . 0 ” e n c o d i n g =”ISO−8859−1”?>
<schema
xmlns : xs =” h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema”
xmlns =” h t t p : / / www. w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema”
t a r g e t N a m e s p a c e =” h t t p : / / mmosim . c s . du . edu / mmoObservat ions ”
v e r s i o n = ” 1 . 0 ”
xml : l a n g =” en ”
xmlns : t n s =” h t t p : / / mmosim . cs . du . edu / mmoObservat ions ”
>
<e l e m e n t name=” p l a y e r O b s e r v a t i o n s ”>
<complexType>
<sequence>
<e l e m e n t
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name=” p l a y e r O b s e r v a t i o n ”
t y p e =” t n s : p l a y e r O b s e r v a t i o n ”
maxOccurs =” unbounded ” />
</ sequence>
</ complexType>
</ e l ement>
<e l e m e n t name=” s n a p s h o t s ”>
<complexType>
<sequence>
<e l e m e n t
name=” s n a p s h o t ”
t y p e =” t n s : s n a p s h o t ”
maxOccurs =” unbounded ” />
</ sequence>
</ complexType>
</ e l ement>
<complexType name=” s n a p s h o t ”>
<sequence>
<e l e m e n t
name=” c h a r a c t e r I n f o r m a t i o n ”
t y p e =” t n s : c h a r a c t e r I n f o r m a t i o n ”
maxOccurs =” unbounded ” />
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</ sequence>
< a t t r i b u t e
name=” s t a r t T i m e ”
t y p e =” da teTime ” />
< a t t r i b u t e
name=” s topTime ”
t y p e =” da teTime ” />
</ complexType>
<complexType name=” c h a r a c t e r I n f o r m a t i o n ”>
<sequence>
<e l e m e n t
name=” playerName ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
<e l e m e n t
name=” l e v e l ”
t y p e =” i n t e g e r ” />
<e l e m e n t
minOccurs =”0”
name=” g u i l d ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
<e l e m e n t
name=” l o c a t i o n ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
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<e l e m e n t
name=” s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
<e l e m e n t
minOccurs =”0”
name=” r a c e ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
<e l e m e n t
minOccurs =”0”
name=” f a c t i o n ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
</ sequence>
</ complexType>
<complexType name=” p l a y e r O b s e r v a t i o n ”>
<sequence>
<e l e m e n t
name=” playerName ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
<e l e m e n t
name=” o b s e r v a t i o n S t a r t ”
t y p e =” da teTime ” />
<e l e m e n t
name=” o b s e r v a t i o n S t o p ”
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t y p e =” da teTime ” />
<e l e m e n t
name=” o b s e r v a t i o n s ”
t y p e =” t n s : o b s e r v a t i o n s ” />
</ sequence>
</ complexType>
<complexType name=” o b s e r v a t i o n s ”>
<sequence>
<e l e m e n t
name=” o b s e r v a t i o n ”
t y p e =” t n s : o b s e r v a t i o n ”
maxOccurs =” unbounded ” />
</ sequence>
</ complexType>
<complexType name=” o b s e r v a t i o n ”>
<sequence>
<e l e m e n t
name=” l o c a t i o n S t a r t ”
t y p e =” da teTime ” />
<e l e m e n t
name=” l o c a t i o n S t o p ”
t y p e =” da teTime ” />
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<e l e m e n t
name=” l o c a t i o n ”
t y p e =” s t r i n g ” />
</ sequence>
</ complexType>
</ schema>
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